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THE SURVEILLANCE GAP:
THE HARMS OF EXTREME PRIVACY AND DATA
MARGINALIZATION
MICHELE GILMAN∞ AND REBECCA GREEN∞∞
ABSTRACT
We live in an age of unprecedented surveillance, enhanced by modern
technology, prompting some to suggest that privacy is dead. Previous scholarship
suggests that no subset of the population feels this phenomenon more than
marginalized communities. Those who rely on public benefits, for example, must
turn over personal information and submit to government surveillance far more
routinely than wealthier citizens who enjoy greater opportunity to protect their
privacy and the ready funds to secure it. This article illuminates the other end of
the spectrum, arguing that many individuals who may value government and
nonprofit services and legal protections fail to enjoy these benefits because they
reside in a “surveillance gap.” These people include undocumented immigrants,
day laborers, homeless persons, and people with felony conviction
histories suffering collateral consequences of their convictions. Members of these
groups often remain outside of the mainstream data flows and institutional
attachments necessary to flourish in American society. The harms that
surveillance gap residents experience can be severe, such as physical and mental
health injuries and lack of economic stability, as well as data marginalization and
resulting invisibility to policymakers. In short, having too much privacy can be as
injurious as having too little.
The sources of the surveillance gap range from attempts to contain and control
marginalized groups to data silos to economic exploitation. This article explores
the boundaries of the surveillance gap, evaluates how this emerging concept fits
within existing privacy paradigms and theoretical frameworks, and suggests
possible solutions to enhance the autonomy and dignity of marginalized people
within the surveillance gap.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Although we live in a highly surveilled society, some people among us are
functionally invisible. For example, low-wage workers—many of whom are
undocumented immigrants—toil out of sight in an underground economy. A lack
of a conventional paper trail or pay stub system linking workers to employers
exposes these workers to potential wage theft and dangerous working conditions.1
While these workers are perilously out of reach of government and nonprofit
organizations that could otherwise provide assistance,2 they are also subject to
heightened forms of surveillance, typically under the increasingly watchful eye of
agencies like Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Likewise, homeless
persons’ lives are defined by extremes: although they tend to live their lives in
public, they are simultaneously governed by laws that criminalize their behavior,
steadily pushing them out of view. Tellingly, when former Governor of Virginia
Terry McAuliffe sought to restore the ability to vote to constituents who had
committed felony crimes, his office was unable to find thousands of people—
people who at one point spent time in the prison and parole systems where their
whereabouts were always known to authorities.3 These examples illustrate that
1. See Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655,
659–60 (2014) (“A coarse definition of day labor is temporary work in which the work, and often
the workers, lack documentation.”).
2. Infra Part II.B.
3. See Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E. 2d 706, 710 (2016) (“McAuliffe’s Executive Order stated
that it removed the political disabilities of approximately 206,000 Virginians who had been
convicted of a felony but who had completed their sentences of incarceration and any periods of
supervised release, including probation and parole.”); ACLU OF VA., ACLU OF VIRGINIA
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marginalized people experience privacy differently than most Americans.
Specifically, they experience privacy extremes—being seen or tracked too much
or too little.
Existing privacy scholarship has largely focused on the harms derived from
too little privacy, and, in this vein, several scholars have highlighted the
particularly intense surveillance of low-income people.4 This article examines the
other end of the spectrum—the surveillance gap. Life in the surveillance gap can
be isolating, stigmatizing, dangerous, and harmful to a person’s physical and
mental health. For one, legal protections available to other members of society
remain out of reach to those in the surveillance gap. People also lose out on
potential sources of economic and social support, because those who seek to
provide services to disadvantaged members of our society often find it nearly
impossible to reach them. Moreover, those who fall within the surveillance gap
are not included within big data streams that ultimately shape public policy, thus
leaving out their experiences and needs from the calculus that goes into creating
policy.5 Frustratingly, the challenges facing these groups remain invisible, further
entrenching these groups’ marginalization.
The surveillance gap has multiple causes, ranging from data silos to poor data
sharing, and from benign neglect to administrative systems that purposefully
exclude certain people. This article seeks to identify and understand the causes,
contours, and consequences of the surveillance gap and to outline legal and policy
tools for addressing it. Part II provides case studies of populations living in the
surveillance gap, including undocumented immigrants, day laborers, homeless
persons, and people with felony conviction histories. Part III situates the
surveillance gap within several scholarly streams. First, it assesses the surveillance
gap through the lens of scholarship that differentiates between privacy harms
experienced by varying groups. Second, it builds on insights from feminist legal
theory involving the public/private binary and the harms associated with having
too much privacy, wrestling with the tensions identified by feminists between
CHALLENGES GOVERNOR MCDONNELL TO RESTORE VOTING RIGHTS TO GREATEST NUMBER POSSIBLE
(June 25, 2013), https://acluva.org/en/press-releases/aclu-virginia-challenges-governor-mcdonnellrestore-voting-rights-greatest-number [https://perma.cc/J9AK-L4E5] (noting that over 350,000
disenfranchised Virginians awaited restoration of their rights).
4. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
1389, 1392–95 (2012) [hereinafter Class Differential]; Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State:
Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEM. 317, 331–32 (2014); Kaaryn Gustafson,
Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297,
312–21 (2013); see generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017) (describing how digital data collection and
algorithmic decision-making processes target and harm the poor); KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE
POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017) (describing how poor mothers in the United States lack a right
to privacy); JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE LIMITS
OF PRIVACY (2001) (describing the hyper-surveillance and lack of privacy rights of a population of
women on public assistance in rural Appalachia).
5. DANIEL CASTRO, CTR. ON DATA INNOVATION, THE RISE OF DATA POVERTY IN AMERICA (Sept.
10, 2014), http://www2.datainnovation.org/2014-data-poverty.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7Y7-FB7Q].
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liberalism’s ideals and individuals’ lived realities. Third, it examines notions of
“choice” and “consent” in consumer and criminal privacy law, testing whether
such frameworks are meaningful with regard to marginalized groups. Fourth, it
adds a new dimension to emerging concepts of privacy as contextual. Fifth, it
reviews fundamental rights theory’s impact on the surveillance gap, positing that
the gap cannot be found in legal regimes that view privacy as a fundamental
human right, such as in the European Union. Part IV suggests ways to address
harms that arise in the surveillance gap while also respecting desirable forms of
privacy and the dignity and autonomy of marginalized persons.
II.
LIFE WITHIN THE SURVEILLANCE GAP
The rise of the surveillance state is well documented.6 Both state and nonstate institutions routinely record individual actions to an unprecedented degree.
Americans have famously been warned: “[p]rivacy is dead, get over it.”7 The socalled death of privacy stems from two main sources. First are the increasingly
sophisticated tools that the government uses to monitor and track the populace.
Fear of the government’s abuse of these tools has prompted some federal and state
laws to protect Americans’ privacy,8 although government surveillance at all
levels is ever expanding and broader than most people realize.9 The second source
derives from the private sector. To say that companies have come to appreciate
the value of consumer data is a gross understatement. Companies now regularly
collect, aggregate, buy, and sell consumer data on virtually every aspect of
people’s lives, including buying preferences, health status, criminal and voting
histories, and physical whereabouts.10 For the modern citizen, this level of
surveillance can be a form of control; it can be benign, helpful, or harmful, often

6. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977);
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY (2001); Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRITISH
J. SOC. 605 (2000).
7. See Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 18 (2013) (discussing source of the quote);
see also Mary Kay Mallonee & Eugene Scott, Comey: ‘There Is No Such Thing as Absolute Privacy
in America’, CNN (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/james-comey-privacycybersecurity/index.html [https://perma.cc/F6XG-9ULF]; Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s
Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy Is Over, READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:25 PM),
https://readwrite.com/2010/01/09/facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov/ [https:
//perma.cc/T5S7-NKDK].
8. See, e.g., the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12,
3121–26 (2012)), and their state equivalents.
9. See generally JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY
YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 9–26 (2017).
10. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2004).
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depending on the perspective of the surveilled.11 Increasingly, large-scale data
sharing between different levels of government and private industry blurs
public/private distinctions. For instance, marketers build profiles of Americans
using data from public databases and individual online browsing histories, while
government agencies such as law enforcement purchase predictive analytic
systems from private companies, which build their algorithms using combined
public and private sources of data.12 Together, government and private-sector
surveillance have created the sense that Americans are universally tracked and that
few—except those living purposely “off the grid”—are able to evade government
or private-sector surveillance.
While this lack of privacy has raised increasingly vocal concerns, the
contemporary phenomenon of non-surveillance—that is, systemic invisibility of
large portions of certain classes of people living in the United States—has received
less attention. We call this the “surveillance gap,” although we acknowledge that
the term is imperfect. While the concept of surveillance is commonly associated
with government control of its citizenry, some of the harms that we identify occur
in the private sphere. Indeed, we adopt a broader notion of “surveillance”
altogether, including all “focused, systematic, routine attention to personal details
for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.”13 This article
thus tracks gaps within a variety of public and private surveillance systems, some
of which overlap. We address our attentions to populations that remain outside
seemingly omnipresent surveillance systems.14 The surveillance gap is a condition
of invisibility in relation to mainstream society, as well as a difference in how
marginalized groups experience privacy.
The phenomenon of “the uncounted” is not new. For decades, certain groups
have been left out of this country’s most basic counting exercise: the U.S. Census.
Since its inception, the census has suffered from not just inaccuracies, but also
what is referred to as the “differential undercount,” or the routine counting of some
classes of people more accurately than others.15 Historically, the classes of
11. For instance, consider Americans’ split reactions to Edward Snowden’s leaks about
National Security Agency surveillance of Americans’ phone records. See Orin Kerr, Edward
Snowden’s Impact, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/04/09/edward-snowdens-impact [https://perma.cc/3EJQ-V45X].
12. Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big
Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 63, 104–07 (2017).
13. DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007).
14. By “gap” we do not refer to a space that must be bridged—indeed, for many individuals,
the surveillance gap provides a crucial coping mechanism and resistance against oppression. As we
discuss infra Part IV, the solution for the surveillance gap is not increased surveillance, but rather
opportunities for marginalized groups to exercise greater autonomy and enhance their dignity.
15. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Safavian, Down for the Count: The Constitutional, Political and
Policy Related Problems of Census Sampling, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 477, 477–78 (2000) (discussing
problems associated with statistical sampling in the U.S. Census); Shane T. Stansbury, Making Sense
of the Census: The Decennial Census Debate and Its Meaning for America’s Ethnic and Racial
Minorities, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 404 (2000) (documenting the problem of census
“undercounts” and the disproportionate impact on racial and ethnic minorities).
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individuals who have received a less accurate count included children, renters,
residents of large cities, and racial minorities.16 This differential undercount is the
census equivalent to the surveillance gap. In recent years, the Census Bureau has
been forthright about such data collection problems for certain groups, even
identifying in a 2016 report a list of groups that present the greatest challenge to
its data collection efforts.17 The Census Bureau uses statistical extrapolation to
“count” many who fall in one or more of these categories.18
Data marginalization in the U.S. Census has real consequences for policymaking in this country, because it impacts federal and state resource allocation,
environmental priorities, and even the power of the ballot.19 The federal
government uses census data to allocate hundreds of billions of dollars each
year.20 Education, welfare, transportation, and a myriad of other federal programs
allocate funds based on census figures.21 A perfect example of this reality relates
to the core purpose of the U.S. Census: apportionment, or the allocation, based on

16. Nathaniel Persily, Color By Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 899, 910 (2000). For an excellent history of the U.S. Census, see PETER SKERRY, COUNTING
ON THE CENSUS? RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS (2000).
17. The full list of categories includes: children, homeless people, lower-income individuals,
those with lower education, non-English-speaking people and/or people who do not have social
security numbers, members of racial or ethnic minorities, people who do not have smart phone or
Internet access, older individuals, people who live in rural areas, persons with disabilities, people
who are angry with the government, and people who live in group quarters. See Memorandum from
Director John H. Thompson to Chair Ditas Katague, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/reports/2016-10-responses-admin_internetwg.pdf [https://perma.cc/X84J-QP8B].
18. For a fascinating article on the legal battles surrounding, inter alia, statistical sampling in
the U.S. Census, see Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom
to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755 (2011).
19. See Marisa Hotchkiss & Jessica Phelan, Uses of Census Bureau Data in Federal Funds
Distribution: A New Design for the 21st Century, CENSUS.GOV (Sept. 2017), https://www2.census.
gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/working-papers/Uses-of-CensusBureau-Data-in-Federal-Funds-Distribution.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9JT-YTZ6] (illustrating in
Table 1 the billions of dollars allocated to programs such as Head Start, Low Income Energy
Assistance, and Voting Access for Individuals with Disabilities).
20. See ANDREW REAMER, COUNTING FOR DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS IN
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL FUNDS 1 (Brookings Inst. ed., 2010),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0309_census_report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/R663-S358] (“In FY2008, 215 federal domestic assistance programs used census-related data to
guide the distribution of $446.7 billion, 31% of all federal assistance. Census-guided grants
accounted for $419.8 billion, 75% of all federal grant funding.”). For a more recent version of this
data, see ANDREW REAMER, COUNTING FOR DOLLARS 2020: THE ROLE OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS IN
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL FUNDS (George Washington Inst. of Pub. Policy ed.,
2017),
https://gwipp.gwu.edu/counting-dollars-role-decennial-census-geographic-distributionfederal-funds [https://perma.cc/HF8H-4YTW].
21. See Samuel Issacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and Minority
Representation: The Constitutional Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal Representation, 13
REV. LITIG. 1, 29 (1993) (citing Abe L. Frank, The 1990 Census: Its Effects on Allocation of Federal
Funds to State and Local Governments, ELECTION CTR. REP. 1 (Apr. 15, 1988)); Hotchkiss & Phelan,
supra note 19, at 9 (“The 2000 Census short form was designed to collect basic demographic and
housing information . . . to be used for apportionment and redistricting.”).
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a state’s population size, of representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives.
When, as is routinely the case, populations are regularly left out of the count, those
populations are, by definition, under-represented. As Samuel Issacharoff and
Allan Lichtman explain, “[i]t is evident that problems surrounding the
undercounting of identifiable groups have predictable political consequences . . .
The undercount results in the underrepresentation of areas of minority
concentration, particularly inner-city neighborhoods, to the benefit of wealthier
suburban and some rural areas.”22
The “undercount” problem—and controversy over how best to cure it—has
consistently plagued census data.23 In the lead-up to the 2020 Census, the Census
Bureau convened a working group focused on improving counting of “Hard to
Count” (HTC) groups.24 The working group considered (1) making greater use of
local data and imagery, (2) encouraging respondents to use the Internet and
telephone, and (3) using administrative records and third-party private-sector
databases.25 Tellingly, the working group ultimately recommended against using
third-party databases and administrative records to find HTC populations, citing
“racialized disparities” in those databases to conclude that they might exacerbate
the problem.26 Mistrust and fear of government, particularly in minority and

22. Issacharoff & Lichtman, supra note 21, at 4.
23. See Persily, The Law of the Census, supra note 18, at 758–69 (discussing “‘Sampling,’
Imputation, and the Undercount” and detailing groups historically undercounted).
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS,
INTERNET, AND HARD TO COUNT WORKING GROUP FOR THE 2020 CENSUS FINAL REPORT (2016),
https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/reports/2016-07-admin_internet-wg-report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HN59-RCVX].
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH-RISK SERIES: PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK
AREAS WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS, No. GAO-17-375T, 42 (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682787.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SFJ-6EH2].
26. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS AND THIRD
PARTY DATA USE IN THE 2020 CENSUS WORKING GROUP FINAL REPORT 9 (2014), https://www
2.census.gov/cac/nac/reports/2014_2020census_wg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YFJ3-2TEL]
(“The
currently available and/or tested government administrative records (AR) exacerbate racialized
disparities in the quality of data available to the Census Bureau. Such racialized disparities may be
attributed to both ‘coverage’ issues and ‘response’ issues in the AR databases’ quality. Such
administrative records databases better ‘cover’ the White population than racial minority populations
and are also more likely to produce cross-database response agreement for the White population than
for racial minority populations.”). The working group also acknowledged that the census’s use of
administrative or other third-party records might violate the privacy interests of people who had
shared their data with third parties:
Individuals disclose information within a particular purpose or context with rules
in mind at the time of disclosure. When interacting with a firm, a website, another
individual, individuals reveal information with an understanding as to who can
see that information, how it might be used, and the context in which it is revealed.
Disclosure of information is not synonymous with information being public—
disclosure is done within expectations of privacy.
Id. at 10.
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immigrant communities, seem likely to create additional problems for the count
in 2020.27
Putting the undercount dilemma aside, this section examines several
populations that evade, avoid, or (by design) fall outside the surveillance radar and
discusses why. Though people living in the surveillance gap suffer differing
experiences and harms, the case studies discussed below reveal several
commonalities. First, the surveillance gap impacts some of the most marginalized
and politically powerless groups in American society—undocumented people, day
laborers, homeless persons, and people with felony conviction histories. Second,
just as surveillance is used as a tool to “exert influence and reproduce power
relations,” the surveillance gap can also serve as a social control mechanism.28
Torin Monahan explains that, when it comes to oppressed populations,
“surveillance plays an important role in policing bodies and maintaining
boundaries between inside and outside, self and other.”29 In other words, careful
watching plays a social sorting function.30 The same can be said of the extreme
privacy that characterizes the surveillance gap. Third, people resist surveillance
systems in subtle and empowering ways,31 quietly reclaiming their humanity and
asserting their rights. Fourth, people in the surveillance gap often lack
fundamental legal rights or access to remedies that protect rights.

27. See Hansi Lo Wang, Run-Up to 2020 Census Raises Concerns over Security and Politics,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/28
/521789446/run-up-to-census-2020-raises-concerns-over-security-and-politics
[https://perma.cc
/R5K9-PE36] (“[The] Census Bureau is facing its longtime challenge of building up public trust.
Kenneth Prewitt, a former director of the Census Bureau who served under the Clinton
administration, says he’s concerned that the immigration debate could determine the questions asked
on the Census.”); Danny Vinik, Trump’s Threat to the 2020 Census, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/04/trumps-threat-to-the-2020-census-000404 [https:
//perma.cc/C7DK-RVEC] (“‘If you imagine that the federal government is asking for personal
information and you feel that the federal government is hostile and that if you were to answer this,
perhaps they would use this against you,’ said Terry Ao Minnis, director of the census and voting
programs at Asian Americans Advancing Justice.”). Some believe that traditionally undercounted
communities will be particularly aggressive advocates for getting counted in the 2020 round. See,
e.g., Nick Visser, The U.S. Won’t Tally LGBT People in 2020 Census, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29,
2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-census-lgbt-americans_us_58db3894e4b0cb23e65
c6cd9 [https://perma.cc/5E4E-PALJ] (suggesting that undercounted groups plan to fight for their
representation).
28. Torin Monahan, Regulating Belonging: Surveillance, Inequality, and the Cultural
Production of Abjections, 10 J. CULT. ECON. 191, 192 (2017).
29. Id.
30. See id. (“[S]urveillance is a mode of ‘social sorting’, of categorizing populations according
to perceived risk or value and treating those respective groups differently.”) (internal citation
omitted).
31. For example, some “welfare recipients subsist by underreporting income, taking side jobs,
engaging in barter economies, paying babysitters by letting them use their electronic benefit transfer
(EBT) food-stamp cards, and so on . . . as ways for individuals to contest the stigmatized
subjectivities that the state and others force upon them.” Id. at 193.
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Undocumented Immigrants

Undocumented immigrants in the United States live at privacy’s extremes.32
Approximately eleven million undocumented immigrants live in the United States,
making up about four percent of the U.S. population.33 Over sixty-two percent
have lived in the United States for ten years or more.34 Over 400,000 people per
year are held in immigration detention in over 250 facilities while they await
deportation or while their removal proceedings are pending.35 Detainees are
treated like inmates whether they are housed in a prison alongside people
convicted of crimes or in a separate detention center.36 Residents of detention
centers are thus subject to extreme surveillance.
At the other end of the privacy extreme are the millions of undocumented
individuals who live their lives in the shadows, fearful of any action or personal
contact with a government agent that could result in deportation. Immigration
enforcement was strengthened during the 1980s War on Drugs and further
bolstered following the terrorist attacks of 9/11.37 During his time in office,
President Barack Obama deported between two to three million people, more than
his predecessors combined, although the level of deportations under his watch
32. By “undocumented immigrant” we mean a person who lacks authorization under the United
States’ immigration laws to be in the United States. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the
Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2009). The term was first used
in the Supreme Court by Justice Sotomayor in Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 588 U.S. 100, 103
(2009). See Christina M. Rodriguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons From
the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 499, 504 (2014).
33. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half a
Decade, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09
/21/unauthorized-immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/5QYU-NX8G];
Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the
U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6NK9-USQG].
34. ROBERT WARREN & DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUDIES, MASS DEPORTATIONS
WOULD IMPOVERISH US FAMILIES AND CREATE IMMENSE SOCIAL COSTS (Aug. 2017), http:
//cmsny.org/publications/mass-deportations-impoverish-us-families-create-immense-costs/ [https:
//perma.cc/JVE8-UJ8V].
35. Detention centers are a mix of state and local jails, federal facilities, and for-profit facilities.
See Maria Mendoza, A System in Need of Repair: The Inhumane Treatment of Detainees in the U.S.
Immigration Detention System, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 405, 426 (2016).
36. “Both are secure environments in which guards monitor each resident’s movements. Meals,
personal and legal visits, access to medical providers, and every other aspect of social life are
regulated.” César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 1346, 1383–84 (2014); see also id. at 1390. Despite the similarities to criminal
imprisonment, detainees actually have fewer rights than criminal defendants. Id. at 1393–97. No
judge individually assesses the validity of their detention or their suitability for release—even though
the vast majority have deep roots in the United States and thus pose little public safety or flight risk.
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
1449, 1457 (2015) (noting that eighty-nine percent of undocumented detainees “have never been
convicted of a violent offense”).
37. On the history of immigration policing, see Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD.
L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2014); on the history of immigration detention, see García Hernández,
Immigration Detention as Punishment, supra note 36, at 1360–82.
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dropped after 2012 due to shifting immigration enforcement priorities.38 His
administration focused on deporting people with criminal convictions and created
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program that offered deferred
deportations and work permits to as many as 2.1 million children brought into the
country as minors.39 President Donald Trump’s administration is pursuing more
aggressive deportation policies,40 including expanding the list of individuals
subject to deportation;41 hiring additional enforcement agents to identify and
deport undocumented immigrants;42 building a 2000-mile wall on the United
States-Mexico border;43 expediting deportation proceedings;44 and ending the
temporary protected status of approximately 200,000 Salvadorans who have
resided in the United States for twenty years.45 These aggressive immigration
enforcement policies have significantly impacted undocumented immigrants and
their surveillance avoidance.
Undocumented immigrants populate the surveillance gap despite, and in part
because of, sophisticated efforts to track them. The government deploys a
technologically-driven system of surveillance designed to identify, find, and
apprehend undocumented people. Government databases, which include
38. See Jennifer M. Chacon, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 247–
49 (2017).
39. Id. at 251–52.
40. Id. at 254.
41. Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united
[https:
//perma.cc/BS3U-F84L].
42. Id. at Sec. 7.
43. Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office
/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements [https:
//perma.cc/H4DK-6GL5].
44. Currently, undocumented immigrants with no connection to any criminal conduct—other
than being in the country illegally—are being deported in expedited proceedings. See Abigail
Hauslohner & Sandhya Somashekhar, Immigration Authorities Arrested 680 People in Raids Last
Week, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/immigrationauthorities-arrested-680-people-in-raids-last-week/2017/02/13/3659da74-f232-11e6-8d72-263470b
f0401_story.html [https://perma.cc/D7G4-43PM] (“[A] DHS official confirmed that the term
‘criminal aliens’ includes anyone who had entered the United States illegally or overstayed or
violated the terms of a visa. There are an estimated 11 million people in the United States who fit
that profile.”); Lisa Rein, Abigail Hauslohner & Sandya Somashekhar, Federal Agents Conduct
Immigration Enforcement Raids in at Least Six States, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2017), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-agents-conduct-sweeping-immigration-enforcementraids-in-at-least-6-states/2017/02/10/4b9f443a-efc8-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html
[https:
//perma.cc/8D6M-YMMW].
45. See Nick Miroff & David Nakamura, 200,000 Salvadorans May Be Forced to Leave the
U.S. as Trump Ends Immigration Protection, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-provisionalresidency-for-200000-salvadorans/2018/01/08/badfde90-f481-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d
_story.html [https://perma.cc/J789-PSR] (discussing how Salvadorans were permitted to live and
work in the United States following devastating earthquakes in El Salvador).
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biometric information such as fingerprints and DNA evidence,46 are shared and
aggregated with private databases that store reams of personal information,
resulting in combined profiles used to enforce immigration laws and regulate
access to social services, education, health care, driver’s licenses, employment,
housing, and transportation.47 Anil Kalhan has labeled this system the
“immigration surveillance state.”48 One of its goals is to identify people who
should be deported; another is to make the level of monitoring so extreme that
individuals self-deport. Another result, and just as common even if not explicitly
intended, is to force these people to flee into the surveillance gap.49
The consequences of hiding from the immigration surveillance state are
concrete and harmful. Undocumented immigrants work, but typically off the
books, in low-wage, dangerous jobs, where they suffer from wage theft and
uncompensated workplace injuries.50 They fear contact with government officials,
which means they are unlikely to enforce their legal rights in court, seek health
care, or use banks or other financial institutions.51 Reporting suggests that Trump
administration policies are greatly exacerbating the problem.52 Undocumented

46. DORIS MEISSNER, DONALD KERWIN, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION
POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE
MACHINERY 5 (2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-unitedstates-rise-formidable-machinery [https://perma.cc/9584-M4GM] (explaining that “US-VISIT, with
its IDENT database, stores more than 148 million fingerprint files that grow by about 10 million
annually” and that it is the “largest law enforcement biometric database in the world,” accessible by
both immigration and law enforcement officials).
47. For example, these integrated systems are used by local police to screen arrestees for
deportability, by employers to determine whether a potential hire is authorized to work, and by social
service agencies to determine Medicaid eligibility. See Kalhan, supra note 37, at 27–34.
48. Id. at 27. According to Kalhan, the immigration surveillance state consists of:
a kind of immigration panopticism, which eliminates zones in society where
immigration status is invisible and irrelevant and puts this large array of public
and private actors in the position of identifying individuals and determining
immigration status; collecting, analyzing, and storing personal information;
screening and identifying potential immigration law violators; and sharing
information with federal immigration authorities.
Id. at 61.
49. Id.
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: What We Can Learn from the Banking
and Credit Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989, 1000 (describing a
fear of using the legal system), 1001 (describing fraud by lenders), 1009 (describing predatory
lending), 1012 (describing under-service of undocumented immigrants by traditional banks) (2015);
Carola Suárez-Orozco, Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Robert Teranishi & Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco,
Growing Up in the Shadows: The Developmental Implications of Unauthorized Status, 81 HARV.
ED. REV. 438, 447 (2011) (“Fear and vigilance shape life in the labyrinth of liminality.”).
52. See Caitlin Dewey, Immigrants Are Going Hungry so Trump Won’t Deport Them, WASH.
POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/16/immigrantsare-now-canceling-their-food-stamps-for-fear-that-trump-will-deport-them
[https://perma.cc
/56WX-97HF] (describing undocumented immigrants’ fear of going to the grocery store).
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immigrants have high rates of crime victimization, but fear reporting to police.53
They fall prey to fraud and extortion schemes.54 They exhibit high rates of stress,
anxiety, and hopelessness.55 Today, widespread fear is resulting in undocumented
people taking extreme measures to avoid immigration authorities, such as pulling
their children out of school and staying locked in their homes56—and even
cancelling annual cultural celebrations.57
Extensive research has recorded the impacts on the 5.5 million children living
in undocumented households: “the effects . . . are uniformly negative, with
millions of U.S. children and youth at risk of lower educational performance,
economic stagnation, blocked mobility, and ambiguous belonging.”58 The 1.1
million undocumented children in the United States can suffer health deficits,
because parents are scared to take them to doctors, and educational delays, because
parents are scared of enrolling them in school.59 Likewise, the 4.5 million U.S.citizen children of undocumented parents suffer from constant fear of family
separation.60 Even though these children are entitled to government benefits such

53. Michelle Mark, Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Appears to Be Having an “Alarming”
Effect on Public Safety, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/trumpsimmigration-ice-order-crackdown-news-alarming-effect-public-safety-2017-3
[https://perma.cc
/FX6P-NAPL].
54. Nereida Moreno, Scam Artists Target Immigrant Communities, Promising Legal Status for
Cash, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/immigration/ctimmigration-notary-fraud-met-20170529-story.html [https://perma.cc/HN3X-XQPE]; Kelly Weill,
Fake ICE Agent Told Immigrants: Pay Me or Get Deported, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 8, 2017),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/fake-ice-agent-told-immigrants-pay-me-or-get-deported
[https:
//perma.cc/N22Z-Z8LZ].
55. James S. Gordon, Living in Fear of Deportation Is Terrible for Your Health, WASH. POST
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/10/living-in-fear-asa-refugee-in-the-u-s-is-terrible-for-your-health [https://perma.cc/A3TB-EGEP].
56. Delphine Schrank, Trump’s Season of Fear: Inside the Devastation Left by Immigration
Raids, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/13
/undocumented-immigration-raids-ice-impact [https://perma.cc/G7LR-PGT2]; Katherine Q. Seeley
& Jess Bidgood, ‘Don’t Open the Door’: How Fear of an Immigration Raid Gripped a City, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/immigration-raid-fear-brocktonmassachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/8MEK-F49T].
57. Christina Silva, Trump’s Immigration Plan Prompts Immigrants to Cancel Cinco de Mayo
Celebration in Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trumpsimmigration-plan-prompts-immigrants-cancel-cinco-de-mayo-570952
[https://perma.cc/6CA9WGMG].
58. Suárez-Orozco, Yoshikawa, Teranishi & Suárez-Orozco, supra note 51, at 461.
59. See id. at 447 (education); Jan Hoffman, Sick and Afraid, Some Immigrants Forgo Medical
Care, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/health/undocumentedimmigrants-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/CQ97-UCU3] (health care).
60. Suárez-Orozco, Yoshikawa, Teranishi & Suárez-Orozco, supra note 51, at 443, 449; Luis
H. Zayas, Sergio Aguilar-Gaxiola, Hyunwoo Yoon & Guillermina Natera Rey, The Distress of
Citizen-Children with Detained and Deported Parents, 24 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 3213, 3213
(2015).
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as childcare subsidies, preschool programs, and food stamps, their parents are
often too terrified to apply for benefits on their behalf.61
In the criminal justice context, Sarah Brayne has identified that law
enforcement surveillance systems result in “system avoidance,” or deliberate
efforts by individuals to avoid institutions that gather and keep formal records.62
Brayne explains that involvement with law enforcement—“from police contact to
incarceration”63—makes individuals wary of interacting with “hospitals, banks,
employment, and schools,”64 likely due to a fear of re-exposure to the criminal
justice system.65 As described above, undocumented immigrants also undertake
such system-avoidance steps.66
Whether they are in detention or attempting to avoid it, undocumented
immigrants live at privacy’s extremes. The United States’ extensive immigration
surveillance system is a creature of law and a tool of control. It seeks to demarcate
the worthy citizen from the unworthy usurper, to create a visible structure that
signifies immigrant fault for societal problems, and to make life in the United
States so untenable that unauthorized immigrants give up trying to come to this
country.
B.

Day Laborers

The modern workplace is a site of extreme surveillance. Employers routinely
require personality and drug tests before hiring and throughout employment; they
observe workers through video cameras, monitor keystrokes, listen to telephone
calls, review emails and Internet usage, deploy mystery shoppers, and track

61. Zayas, Aguilar-Gaxiola, Yoon & Natera Rey, supra note 60, at 3214; see also SuárezOrozco, Yoshikawa, Teranishi & Suárez-Orozco, supra note 51, at 447 (describing how parents must
discuss with their children plans for their care in the event of a parent’s deportation as “a unique
parental ethnic-racial socialization to the realities of a shadowed existence”); Annie Lowrey,
Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Policies Are Scaring Eligible Families Away from the Safety Net, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/trump-safety-net-latinofamilies/520779/ [https://perma.cc/5WKR-T4B9] (noting that just living under the cloud of
deportability puts children in a “constant sense of vulnerability” that creates anxiety and stress levels
that “lead to aberrant development trajectories in otherwise healthy children”).
62. Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and
Institutional Attachment, 79(3) AM. SOC. ASS’N 367, 368 (2014).
63. Id. at 368.
64. Id. at 385–86. These effects start early—for young people, “paternalistic contact with the
state may lead people to avoid institutions that promote prosocial adult activity.” Id. at 386. All these
impacts fall most heavily on disadvantaged and minority populations that face the most extensive
surveillance.
65. Brayne, supra note 62, at 372, 385.
66. See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text. Given the overlap between the criminal
justice and immigration systems in terms of information sharing and incarceration—a phenomenon
known as crimmigration, see Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policing Sex, Policing Immigrants: What
Crimmigration’s Past Can Tell Us About Its Present and Its Future, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 149, 151–
52 (2016)—it is not surprising that system avoidance is creating a surveillance gap for many
undocumented immigrants.
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movements through GPS or radio frequency devices.67 The realities of rampant
workplace surveillance are only one extreme; thousands of workers operate
beyond the reach of these surveillance regimes and find themselves in the
surveillance gap.
One group of such workers is day laborers. On any given day in the United
States, approximately 117,600 people68 seek work as day laborers in jobs such as
construction, landscaping, roofing, and painting, as well as in restaurants and nail
salons.69 Employers typically hire day laborers on a day-to-day basis at a public
site (such as a gas station, street corner, or home improvement store parking lot),
where as many as two hundred workers may gather.70 The employer and worker
negotiate a verbal, short-term employment agreement.71 Day-labor markets are
usually unregulated, and workers are paid in cash;72 this is “temporary work in
which the work, and often the workers, lack documentation.”73 Earnings are
variable, but the median wage for day laborers is $10 per hour,74 meaning that
most day laborers remain below the poverty level, as their annual earnings rarely
exceed $15,000.75 The market for day labor is driven by employer demands for

67. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 735, 743–44 (2017); Kristie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An Overview, 51 LAB.
HIST. 87, 89–90 (2010). These tools are particularly concentrated in the low-wage workforce. See
Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1400–02. Overall, the purposes of workplace surveillance are to
maximize worker productivity, protect proprietary information, reduce theft, and increase employee
welfare and safety. Id. at 1408; Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra, at 739. Yet these systems also
have economic and social costs. Studies find that employees suffer physical and mental effects from
surveillance, as well as safety hazards. See id. at 744. Additional impacts on the bottom line can
result from low morale, diminished trust, and high turnover. See id. at 745.
68. ABEL VALENZUELA JR., NIK THEODORE, EDWIN MELÉNDEZ & ANA LUZ GONZALEZ, ON THE
CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2006), http://portlandvoz.org/wpcontent/uploads/images/2009/04/national-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU37-EJMX].
69. Id. at 9; Rebecca Smith, Legal Protection and Advocacy for Contingent or “Casual”
Workers in the United States: A Case Study in Day Labor, 88 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 197, 203–04
(2008); Nicole Taykhman, Defying Silence: Immigrant Women Workers, Wage Theft, and AntiRetaliation Policy in the States, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 96, 114 (2016) (discussing tactics used
by nail salons, restaurants, and construction companies to avoid paying after an adverse wage theft
case judgment).
70. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 1.
71. Id.; Smith, supra note 69, at 203; Lee, supra note 1, at 661; IMMIGRANTS’
RIGHTS/INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, DAY
LABORERS, WAGE THEFT, AND WORKPLACE JUSTICE IN NEW JERSEY 1 (2011),
https://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/CSJ/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile
&PageID=177699 [https://perma.cc/HSD4-F6GK] [hereinafter SETON HALL CLINIC].
72. SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 1.
73. Lee, supra note 1, at 559–660. Seventy-five percent of the day-labor workforce is
undocumented. See Nalini Junko Negi, Battling Discrimination and Social Isolation: Psychological
Distress Among Latino Day Laborers, 51 AM. J. COMM. PSYCHOL. 164, 164 (2013); see also Smith,
supra note 71, at 204.
74. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 10–11.
75. Smith, supra note 69, at 204; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 7 (finding in a study
of New Jersey laborers weekly income ranging from $200 to $400 and an ability to find work for
one to three days per week).
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worker flexibility, a downtick in industrial and manufacturing jobs, and the
number of migrant workers willing to accept payment below market and legally
mandated rates.76
Numerous studies highlight the vulnerabilities of day laborers. Many day
laborers report being victims of wage theft, or the failure to be paid what a worker
is owed under law.77 Day laborers also toil in dangerous workplaces and suffer
high rates of injury. A national study of day laborers found that one in five suffered
a work-related injury and that half of those injured did not receive medical care.78
Another study found that employers abuse day laborers by denying them adequate
breaks for food, water, or rest (44%), abandoning workers at the work site (27%),
insulting and threatening workers (28%), and even acting violently toward
workers (18%).79 These day laborers face extreme social isolation, as their
families are often left behind in their home countries, and, while in the United
States, these workers avoid mainstream social venues.80 In sum, “[i]ts social

76. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 1–2; Janice Fine,
Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 417, 429–
30 (2005–2006); Edwin J. Meléndez, M. Anne Visser, Nik Theodore & Abel Valenzuela, Jr., Worker
Centers and Day Laborers’ Wages, 95 SOC. SCI. Q. 835, 835 (2014).
77. Negi, supra note 73, at 164. A study of New Jersey’s day laborers found that fifty-four
percent of day laborers statewide were paid less than they were promised by at least one employer.
See SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 7. A 2006 national study showed that “[n]early half of all
day laborers (49 percent) have been completely denied payment by an employer for work they
completed in the two months prior to being surveyed. Similarly, 48 percent have been underpaid by
employers during the same time period.” VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra
note 68, at 15. In light of the pervasiveness of this practice, it should come as no surprise that wage
theft takes many forms:
paying below the legal minimum; not paying for time worked by having workers
work “off the clock” before checking in, after clocking out, or by requiring work
during unpaid break time; not paying for overtime work at the statutory overtime
rate; for tipped employees, expropriating tips that should be the employee’s; or
just not paying at all.
Matthew W. Finkin, From Weight Checking to Wage Checking: Arming Workers to Combat Wage
Theft, 90 IND. L.J. 851, 851 (2015).
78. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 12–14; Smith, supra
note 71, at 204; Negi, supra note 73, at 164. The Seton Hall study found that twenty-six percent of
day laborers were injured severely enough that they could not work. SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note
71, at 8. Two-thirds of injured workers lose work time due to injury, while others continue to work
despite injuries due to their dire need for income. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ &
GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 12. Injuries are caused by hazardous conditions such as chemical
exposures; faulty equipment such as poor scaffold construction; lack of protective gear; and lack of
safety training. Id.
79. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 68, at 15.
80. Negi, supra note 73, at 171. Studies of Latina immigrants reveal similar findings of
loneliness, isolation, and lack of social support. See Alejandra Hurtado-de-Mendoza, Felisa A.
Gonzalez, Adriana Serrano & Stacey Kaltman, Social Isolation and Perceived Barriers to
Establishing Social Networks Among Latina Immigrants, 53 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 73, 78
(2014).
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status, physical danger, and uncertainty set day labor apart from other forms of
work.”81
All of these abuses are against the law; the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)82 sets forth specific pay, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements and
covers citizens and non-citizens alike.83 Indeed, courts have held that questions
about citizenship status are impermissible in FLSA lawsuits.84 Yet the law offers
little recourse for day laborers. To begin with, because the majority of day laborers
are undocumented, they live in fear that employers will retaliate against them by
calling immigration authorities if they complain or make demands.85
Day laborers who are willing to pursue their statutory rights face additional
challenges. Government enforcement agencies are notoriously reluctant,
understaffed, and ineffective in policing day labor violations.86 This is
compounded by language barriers and lack of information about legal rights.87
Private lawsuits are hard to bring because the low dollar value of a claim deters
private attorneys from taking on these claims.88 Even for pro bono and public
interest attorneys, lawsuits can be challenging because the employers frequently
exist off the books, with no legal status, identifiable address, or entity to sue.89
Collecting judgments is often fruitless as many employers develop “tactics to
successfully avoid paying judgments even after losing the case,” such as declaring
bankruptcy, selling their property, and creating bogus shell companies to hide

81. Lee, supra note 1, at 660; see also Jayesh M. Rathod, Danger and Dignity: Immigrant Day
Laborers and Occupational Risk, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 813, 831–32, 849–52 (2016).
82. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. (2014).
83. See Smith, supra note 71, at 205; see also Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927,
933 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[E]mployers who unlawfully hire unauthorized aliens must otherwise comply
with federal employment laws.”).
84. Jennifer J. Lee, Outsiders Looking In: Advancing the Immigrant Worker Movement
Through Strategic Mainstreaming, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1063, 1075 (2014) (citing cases).
85. Id.; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 1.
86. Smith, supra note 71, at 201; Lee, supra note 1, at 662; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note
71, at 10; Finkin, supra note 77, at 855 (“This system has not proven equal to the task.”).
87. Lee, supra note 1, at 662; SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71, at 1.
88. Lee, supra note 1, at 662. The Seton Hall Clinic study found that only 2.6% of workers
filed complaints with the state labor agency; 3.4% filed in small claims court; and 26% reported that
employers threatened to report them to immigration authorities. SETON HALL CLINIC, supra note 71,
at 9.
89. Rebecca J. Livengood, Organizing for Structural Change: The Potential and Promise of
Worker Centers, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 346–47 (2013) (“Employers who flout wage and
hour regulations may also violate other laws regarding business corporations, and these violations
may make employers more difficult to sue and to bind via judgment.”).
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assets.90 There is often no paper trail, such as pay stubs,91 time sheets, or tax
reporting forms,92 linking these workers to their employers.
In addition, employers commonly misclassify day laborers as independent
contractors, removing them from the purview of legal protections for wages and
against discrimination, as well as workplace benefits such as workers
compensation, unemployment insurance, and social security disability.93 In turn,
workers lack the legal knowledge or resources to challenge those
misclassifications.94 Many day laborers are hired by fly-by-night subcontractors,
allowing companies at the top of the contracting chain to wash their hands of
liability.95 Making matters worse, many employers deem the costs of complying
with compensation laws in the short term to be greater than the long-term costs of
violating said laws, leading them to shirk their legal obligations.96
Simultaneously, some jurisdictions have enacted anti-solicitation statutes to
crack down on day-labor sites due to perceived threats to community safety and
potential economic injuries to local businesses.97 These laws push day laborers
further into the surveillance gap. Moreover, when day laborers organize to claim
and demand their rights—essential forms of resistance to the surveillance gap98—
they face increased pushback through employer lawsuits99 and politically
motivated restrictions on organizing.100 Thus, day laborers find themselves in a
90. Taykhman, supra note 69, at 114.
91. See, e.g., Arturo Gonzalez, Day Labor in the Golden State, CAL. ECON. POL’Y, July 2007,
at 5, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cep/EP_707AGEP.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF5H-DMYM].
“In most cases, employers and workers publicly negotiate terms of employment, including the type
and length of task to be performed and the payment, typically in cash, for the work provided.” Id. at
2. One of this article’s co-authors, Michele Gilman, directs a law clinic that handles wage and hour
claims. In the clinic’s experience working with day laborers, it is often impossible to obtain
documentation of hours worked or pay earned, because employers pay in cash and/or fail to create
such records.
92. Lee, supra note 1, at 660.
93. See Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of Wage
Litigation and Its Impact on Low Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 362 (2013);
David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four Billion Dollar
Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 140–41, 144–45 (2015).
94. See Raja Raghunath, A Founding Failure of Enforcement: Freedmen, Day Laborers, and
the Perils of an Ineffectual State, 18 CUNY L. REV. 47, 60–63 (2014).
95. See Ruan, supra note 93, at 359.
96. See Finkin, supra note 77, at 855.
97. Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 1617, 1627–28 (2011); Negi, supra note 73, at 164; Smith, supra note 71, at 210 (noting
that some of these statutes have been overturned as free speech violations).
98. See infra Part IV.
99. Nicole Hallett, From the Picket Line to the Courtroom: A Labor Organizing Privilege to
Protect Workers, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 475, 478–79 (2015) (describing employer
litigation tactics to squelch day-labor organizing).
100. See Cummings, supra note 97, at 1620 (discussing anti-solicitation ordinances designed
to push day laborers out of certain areas); Ben Penn & Tyrone Richardson, Labor Department
Looking into Worker Center Scrutiny: Acosta, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/labor-department-looking-n73014472124/ [https://perma.cc/BUT5-XSHY]
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constant push-and-pull between remaining in the surveillance gap and surfacing
to assert their rights, facing the associated risks of doing so.
C.

Homeless People

Homeless people live in a polarized state of privacy—on the one hand, they
live their lives in public; on the other hand, they are pushed to the margins of
public spaces and often treated as invisible by passers-by. According to a 2015
study by the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, “at least 2.5 to 3.5
million Americans sleep in shelters, transitional housing, and public places [and]
an additional 7.4 million have lost their own homes and are doubled-up with others
due to economic necessity.”101 One-third of homeless people live outside,
exposing their belongings and personal lives to the public;102 about two-thirds of
homeless persons reside in some form of shelter or transitional housing.103 These
shelter settings are privacy-stripping by their very nature, due to a status quo
defined by overcrowding and pervasive surveillance systems.104 Regardless of
whether they have found shelter or live their lives out in the open, homeless
individuals find that their destitution is often on display.105 Yet, paradoxically,
homeless people simultaneously inhabit a state of invisibility, a form of extreme
privacy brought about by societal norms and laws that push people without homes
to society’s margins. As Don Mitchell and Nik Heynan describe, “[l]aws (or
increased policing) that make sleeping more difficult and dangerous, panhandling
riskier, and tending to bodily needs all but impossible, push the homeless as well
as the housed poor more deeply into the urban shadows.”106
Surveillance of homeless people comes in many forms: homeless people
hoping to secure a place in a shelter must answer personal intake questions and
submit to background checks as the price of admission. To remain in the shelter,

(discussing the Trump administration’s attempts to define worker centers as unions in order to
subject them to financial disclosure rules).
101. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: OVERVIEW
OF DATA AND CAUSES (Jan. 2015), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet
[https://perma.cc/T8JE-UHT7].
102. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., THE 2016 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT
REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 8 (2016), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents
/2016-AHAR-Part-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3A3-Z7S7] [hereinafter AHAR].
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 140–141 and accompanying text.
105. “[T]he hallmark of homelessness is a lack of private seclusion, so people experiencing
homelessness endure conditions of persistent, nearly inescapable visibility.” Sara K. Rankin, The
Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 6 (2016). Homelessness is associated with vice, laziness, and
pathology. See id. at 7, 14; Tony Sparks, Broke Not Broken: Rights, Privacy, and Homelessness in
Seattle, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 842, 843 (2010).
106. Don Mitchell & Nik Heynan, The Geography of Survival and the Right to the City:
Speculations on Surveillance, Legal Innovation, and the Criminalization of Intervention, 30 URB.
GEOGRAPHY 611, 613 (2009).
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they must acquiesce to extensive and prolonged surveillance.107 Further, to access
certain social services, homeless people must provide answers to highly personal
questions, including information about HIV/AIDS status, mental health and
substance abuse history, and their experience with domestic violence.108 Their
responses are funneled into the nationwide Homeless Management Information
System (HMIS), a database designed to assess and measure needs and to
coordinate a response through homeless services.109 In addition, and specifically
for homeless families, the school systems’ residency verification requirements can
worsen housing instability. For example, if, as a result of a school inquiry, a
landlord learns that unauthorized occupants are living in a unit, she might evict
the occupants—people who likely have no other place to go.110
The law has limited capacity to protect homeless individuals from these
privacy intrusions, largely because the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable government searches and seizures generally does not apply to people
and personal items in public spaces.111 Yet the activities of homeless people are,
by necessity, “conducted in public; [homeless people] typically make their ‘home’
on property that they are not entitled to be on; their belongings and activities are
on ‘open fields’ which common passersby can easily see; and they are almost
perpetually voluntarily exposing themselves to the public.”112 United States v.
Jones,113 which held that it is an unconstitutional physical trespass for police to

107. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 856 (describing a state of “heightened surveillance and
nearly constant hypervisibility”).
108. J.C. O’Brien, Loose Standards, Tight Lips: Why Easy Access to Client Data Can
Undermine Homeless Management Information Systems, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673, 688 (2007).
109. See HMIS Data and Technical Standards, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/hmis/hmis-data-and-technical-standards/
[https:
//perma.cc/L56W-ZFA8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
110. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESS STUDENTS COUNT: HOW
STATES AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS CAN COMPLY WITH THE NEW MCKINNEY-VENTO EDUCATION LAW
POST-ESSA 8 (2016), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless-Students-Count [https:
//perma.cc/PN22-CYRC] (“[School systems] must use due care to ensure that residency verification
policies, McKinney-Vento eligibility determinations, and other procedures designed to prevent fraud
accommodate the unique needs of homeless students and/or their families, and do no erect barriers
to their identification or immediate enrollment.”).
111. On personal property, see generally Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth
Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946 (2016). Brady discusses
cases involving property of homeless persons, concluding that homeless persons fare poorly before
courts that focus only on the location of privacy, but do better before courts that look at the overall
context of the item and the expectations of its owner.
112. Kami Chavis Simmons, Future of the Fourth Amendment: The Problem with Privacy,
Poverty and Policing, 14 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 240, 250 (2014); see also
Lindsay J. Gus, The Forgotten Residents: Defining the Fourth Amendment “House” to the Detriment
of the Homeless, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 769 (2016); Elizabeth Schutz, The Fourth Amendment Rights
of the Homeless, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (1992); Justin Stec, Why the Homeless Are Denied
Personhood Under the Law: Toward Contextualizing the Reasonableness Standard in Search and
Seizure Jurisprudence, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 321 (2006); David H. Steinberg, Constructing
Homes for the Homeless? Searching for a Fourth Amendment Standard, 41 DUKE L.J. 1508 (1992).
113. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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put a GPS on a person’s car, has spurred hope that the Supreme Court might
expand notions of privacy outside the home.114 Yet Kami Chavis Simmons argues
that this is unlikely to help the poor, because it does not reach “the face-to-face
law enforcement interactions that many residents of poor, urban neighborhoods
face on a daily basis.”115 For these reasons, it is widely recognized that homeless
people lack the legal or spatial privacy granted to people who can afford homes.
By contrast, it is less recognized how homelessness can result in too much
privacy—or a surveillance gap.
Homeless people inhabit the surveillance gap for several reasons. To begin
with, homeless people who live outside (roughly one-third of the homeless
population) face a barrage of laws designed to push them out of sight.116 Across
the country, cities have enacted laws that essentially criminalize homelessness—
these laws prohibit camping in public; sleeping in public; sleeping in vehicles;
sitting or lying down in public; panhandling; loitering, loafing, and vagrancy;
living in vehicles; bathing in public fountains; urinating or defecating in public;
using shopping carts in public parks; storing personal property on public property;
and sharing food in public.117 At the same time, local law enforcement agents
issue “move-on” orders and trespass warnings to homeless people and engage in
sweeps of homeless camps, removing homeless people from public space and
destroying their belongings.118 Ironically, surveillance technologies deployed by
law enforcement, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras positioned
around cities, operate to push homeless people into the surveillance gap.119
Together, these statutes and enforcement strategies disperse the homeless to
secluded places, where the cycle of “banishment” and “eviction” begins again.120
As a result, homeless persons dedicate “more resources of time, energy, and
money into not appearing homeless, or disappearing into darker and more
dangerous recesses of the urban fabric.”121 Criminalization policies that make it
harder for people to exit homelessness—such as expensive fines and the collateral
114. See Simmons, supra note 112, at 240.
115. Id. at 255.
116. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES
10–12, 22–28 (2016),
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Housing-Not-Handcuffs
[https://perma.cc/S2HQ-UEPD]
[hereinafter HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS]; Jordan Bailey, Food-Sharing Restrictions: A New Method
of Criminalizing Homelessness in American Cities, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 273, 277–80
(2016). On food sharing restrictions, see also Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 623–24.
117. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 22–28.
118. Id. at 12, 30–31; see also Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 617.
119. See Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 618–19. CCTV cameras are also positioned
above dumpsters in order to discourage dumpster diving and to prevent homeless people from
sleeping in them. Id. at 618.
120. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 12, 30.
121. See Sig Langegger & Stephen Koester, INVISIBLE HOMELESSNESS: ANONYMITY,
EXPOSURE AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 26, http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges
/CLAS/Departments/PoliticalScience/Research/Documents/Homelessness%20Research/Invisible%
20Homelessness_Langegger_Koester.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DFT-GQKY].
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consequences of convictions—create barriers to employment and secure housing,
which in turn perpetuate residence in the surveillance gap.122
Lawsuits challenging municipal restrictions against homeless people have
had mixed results.123 Most successful have been challenges to food-sharing laws
in which the plaintiffs are not homeless people, but rather charities claiming
violations of their associational and free-exercise-of-religion rights.124 The
number of laws that force homeless people into the surveillance gap has increased
across the board, in some cases dramatically, over the last decade.125 During this
time, courts have found ways to distinguish groundbreaking cases such as
Pottinger v. City of Miami,126 which held that it is unconstitutional to arrest
homeless individuals for engaging in “life sustaining conduct” such as sleeping,
sitting, or standing in certain public places.127 Finally, even when a court strikes
down an anti-homeless ordinance, the remedy awarded tends to fall short of
addressing the underlying structural problem: a lack of available housing.128
Unaccompanied homeless children represent a particularly distressing
subsection of the surveillance gap population.129 An estimated 1.7 million

122. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 13.
123. See Marc L. Roark, Homelessness at the Cathedral, 80 MO. L. REV. 53, 126–27 (2015)
(describing legal successes and subsequent development of doctrine); see also Rankin, supra note
105, at 31–36 (discussing First Amendment challenges to anti-begging ordinances), 48–50
(discussing Eighth Amendment challenges to criminalization of homelessness laws).
124. See Bailey, supra note 116, at 289–90. In particular, cities have had better success in
defending food-sharing laws that restrict, rather than forbid, food sharing. Id. at 290 (“A City
determined to keep charities from feeding individuals experiencing homelessness will always be
able to find permitted alternatives if a preferred method is defeated in litigation.”).
125. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 116, at 10–11. For instance, camping bans have
increased by 69%; sleeping in public bans have increased by 31%; bans on sitting or lying down in
public have increased by 52%; bans on loitering, loafing, and vagrancy have increased by 88%; bans
on living in vehicles have increased by 143%; and panhandling bans have increased by 43%.
126. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
127. The arrests violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on warrantless searches and seizures, the Due Process Clause, and
the right to travel. Id. at 1565–77. However, the original Pottinger holding was narrowed
considerably in subsequent years. For an overview of litigation results, see Donald Saelinger,
Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances Criminalizing Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 555–57 (2006).
128. See Eric S. Tars, Heather Maria Johnson, Tristia Bauman & Maria Foscarinis, Can I Get
Some Remedy?: Criminalization of Homelessness and the Obligation to Provide an Effective
Remedy, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 738, 743 (2014) (discussing the Pottinger case and noting,
despite a favorable holding in the lower court, a failure to ultimately secure adequate housing as a
part of a later settlement).
129. See Lynn M. Harter, Charlene Berquist, B. Scott Titsworth, David Novak & Tod Brokaw,
The Structuring of Invisibility Among the Hidden Homeless: The Politics of Space, Stigma, and
Identity Constructions, 33 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 305, 306 (2005). A point-in-time survey identified
36,097 unaccompanied homeless children and youth. This number is likely to be an undercount. See
NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 1, 30 (2016),
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-ofhomelessness-report/ [https://perma.cc/M25M-8B5F].
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children fall into this category per year.130 These children typically fall into
homelessness due to family strife, financial crises, and housing instability.131 A
large proportion are LGBTQ132 and are cast out by their families.133 Homeless
children are acutely aware of the stigma of homelessness, which drives them to
live their lives underground, to mask their homelessness. As Lynn Harter and her
colleagues explain, “[t]o make their status visible by seeking help risks public
stigmatization; to avoid stigmatization requires invisibility.”134 Thus, they
develop street smarts to survive, which involves “reliance on instincts to read a
situation, preparedness, adaptability, and in general a heightened level of
awareness of one’s surroundings.”135 However, these tactics of invisibility can
consequently limit access to services provided by the government or private
agencies. Further, the tensions of maintaining invisibility result in some young
people becoming “aggressive,” which “often put[s] them at risk for arrest and
incarceration,” while other youths become “withdrawn, listless, or depressed—
characteristics that increase their likelihood of experiencing personal
victimization.”136 Homeless children are particularly susceptible to physical abuse
and sexual exploitation, and they may resultantly face mental health challenges,
develop substance abuse issues, or even die.137 Meanwhile, schools and other
institutions are unable (or unwilling) to recognize and develop the survival skills
that homeless children have honed, despite the potential sources of social capital
or personal transformation these skills represent.138 While the McKinney-Vento
Homeless Assistance Act requires states and school districts to identify homeless
children and enroll them in school, the law is inadequately funded, and states
struggle to comply due to a lack of staffing and technical assistance.139

130. Supporting the Education of Unaccompanied Students Experiencing Homelessness,
NAT’L CTR. FOR HOMELESS EDUC. 2 (Aug. 2017), https://nche.ed.gov/downloads/briefs/youth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VSU6-DTW2].
131. See Homeless and Runaway Youth, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr.
14, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/homeless-and-runaway-youth.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/7YGT-Y6FQ].
132. Id. (between twenty and forty percent).
133. Alex Morris, The Forsaken: A Rising Number of Homeless Gay Teens Are Being Cast Out
by Religious Families, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com
/culture/features/the-forsaken-a-rising-number-of-homeless-gay-teens-are-being-cast-out-by-religi
ous-families-20140903 [https://perma.cc/M3RJ-ZXH3]. Shelters offer limited beds for the youth
population, and children congregate in different areas than homeless adults. See Harter, Berquist,
Titsworth, Novak & Brokaw, supra note 129, at 312–15.
134. Harter, Berquist, Titsworth, Novak & Brokaw, supra note 129, at 323.
135. Id. at 319.
136. Id. at 318.
137. See Homeless and Runaway Youth, supra note 131.
138. Harter, Berquist, Titsworth, Novak & Brokaw, supra note 129, at 321–22.
139. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY: HOMELESS STUDENTS COUNT: HOW
STATES AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS CAN COMPLY WITH THE NEW MCKINNEY-VENTO EDUCATION LAW
POST-ESSA 2 (2016), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless-Students-Count [https:
//perma.cc/WM4X-AJP3].
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The surveillance gap is also reinforced when homeless people refuse social
services. Shelters can be dehumanizing and dangerous, with a lack of privacy,
strict conduct rules, and extreme surveillance, leading some homeless persons to
prefer living outside.140 Some shelters sound more like prisons than social service
providers; for example, one such shelter is “operated by the county’s sheriff’s
department with the help of private security guards, [where] rule breakers are
required to sleep outside in an exposed courtyard, even when it rains.”141 This
lack of privacy may be why some people who find themselves impoverished resist
the shelter systems and, therefore, circumvent additional public aid that may
otherwise enable them and their children to break the cycle of poverty.
In addition, homeless people may not seek out shelters because they do not
want to provide the personal information that HMIS systems require.142 Notably,
information provided to HMIS can be released to law enforcement on a mere oral
request for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect or material witness.143
As one commentator has noted, “[t]he ease of accessibility to client [data] through
oral requests threatens to compound the already challenging task of eliciting
complete and accurate information from homeless clients,”144 who are, by virtue
of their homelessness, often living in violation of laws that regulate their public
conduct. Of course, this withdrawal from homeless service systems has a cost, as
people lose out on public aid and services that may be able to help them survive
or transition out of homelessness. Still, by opting to remain in the surveillance gap,
homeless people are pointedly defying surveillance.145 Thus, the story of
homelessness is “not a one-way story of oppression, restriction, and decline . . . .
It is also a story of both coping in the shadowed interstices of the city and of
fighting back.”146
D.

People with Felony Conviction Histories

A final and much narrower example illustrates the nuanced gradations of the
surveillance gap: the elusiveness of Virginians with felony conviction histories
who, despite the Commonwealth’s desire to reinstate their right to vote, cannot be
located by government officials.147 Virginia’s constitution strips individuals
140. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 849, 856.
141. Id.
142. See O’Brien, supra note 108, at 689–90.
143. Id. at 693.
144. Id. at 694.
145. See Geoffrey DeVerteuil, Matthew Marr & David Snow, Any Space Left? Homelessness
Resistance by Place-Type in Los Angeles County, 30 URB. GEOGRAPHY 633, 635 (2009) (describing
the act of refusing shelter as a “form of resistance to the infantilizing tendencies of the welfare
state”).
146. Mitchell & Heynan, supra note 106, at 613. Homeless resistance to the surveillance gap
is discussed infra Part IV.
147. One of the primary motivations for writing this article comes from co-author Rebecca
Green’s experience working on rights restoration in Virginia. In 2014, Green and her then-student
Mark Listes co-founded Revive My Vote, a nonpartisan organization that assists Virginians in
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convicted of a felony of their voting rights permanently,148 but the governor has
discretion to restore voting rights to individuals.149 Starting with his inauguration
in 2014, former Governor McAuliffe made restoring voting rights to those with
felony convictions a centerpiece of his administration.150 In April 2016,
McAuliffe decided to grant the right to vote to every Virginian who had finished
her term of incarceration and supervised probation.151 Yet when it came to
identifying and locating those whose rights were to be restored, the Restoration of
Rights Office (RoR) within Virginia’s Secretary of the Commonwealth could
identify only 206,000152 of the estimated 350,000153 people who stood to regain
the right to vote in Virginia. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court found that
McAuliffe’s April order violated the Virginia constitution, requiring McAuliffe
instead to restore rights on a case-by-case basis.154 McAuliffe proceeded to
comply by affirmatively restoring rights to every eligible person meeting his
single criterion: completion of her term of incarceration and supervised
probation.155 While McAuliffe restored rights to more Virginians than any other
regaining the right to vote through a hotline and website. REVIVE MY VOTE, www.revivemyvote.com
[https://perma.cc/Y4WX-H5GX] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). Through a generous grant from the
Knight Foundation, Revive My Vote has helped hundreds of Virginians. Governor McAuliffe’s 2016
reforms make rights restoration easier than it has ever been. That said, Revive My Vote’s hotline has
received queries from hundreds of Virginians who, for many reasons as discussed here, fall through
the cracks of Virginia’s records systems.
148. See VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“No person who has been convicted of a felony shall be
qualified to vote unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor or other appropriate
authority.”). Virginia is one of four states that permanently disenfranchise people convicted of
felonies. The other three are Florida, Kentucky, and Iowa. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in
the United States, SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org
/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/6FU7UDPW]. According to the Sentencing Project, 6.1 million United States citizens cannot vote because
of a felony conviction. Id.
149. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
150. Press Release by Office of the Governor of Va., Governor McAuliffe Restores More
Voting Rights than Any Governor in American History (Apr. 27, 2016), https:
//governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/newsarticle?articleId=20164
[https://perma.cc/J82K-96XS]
(explaining at an April 2017 rights restoration event in Norfolk that “[e]xpanding democracy in
Virginia has been my proudest achievement during my time as Governor”).
151. See Press Release by Office of the Governor of Va., Governor McAuliffe Restores Voting
and Civil Rights to Over 200,000 Virginians (Apr. 22, 2016), https://governor.virginia.gov
/newsroom/newsarticle?articleId=15008 [https://perma.cc/6BWQ-9WLZ].
152. See Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E. 2d 706, 710 (2016).
153. See ACLU OF VIRGINIA, supra note 3. Some sources put this figure closer to 450,000. See
Dara Lind, Map: 5.8 Million Americans Can’t Vote Because of Their Criminal Records, VOX (Oct.
5, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/5/6906875/state-prisoner-voting-law-felondisenfranchisement-map-virginia [https://perma.cc/F5U8-VW4X].
154. See Howell, 788 S.E. 2d at 722–24.
155. McAuliffe announced the new standard for rights restoration on August 22, 2016,
following the Supreme Court of Virginia’s ruling that his April 22, 2016, blanket restoration
exceeded his authority under Virginia’s constitution. The new standard instructed the Secretary of
the Commonwealth’s office to identify “individuals who may meet the Governor’s standards for
restoration: individuals who have been convicted of a felony and are no longer incarcerated or under
active supervision by the Department of Corrections (DOC) or other state agency.” See Governor
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governor in the state’s history (173,000 people during his term),156 he had the
political will to restore many more. What stood in his way, even amid a socalled “golden age of surveillance,” was his administration’s inability to identify,
locate, and notify all eligible individuals.157
It has been difficult for RoR to locate eligible Virginians for several reasons.
To begin, RoR is dependent on other state agencies to provide data on individuals
who may be eligible, yet Virginia statutes, like those of other states, prohibit
information sharing between state agencies except under defined
circumstances.158 Further, confidentiality restrictions on who may access state
databases prevent advocacy groups from helping with the work.159
Accessing Virginia’s court records to confirm eligibility and contact
information is likewise constrained. Prior to 2016, Virginians hoping to regain the
right to vote could do so only by submitting an application.160 Since Virginia lacks
a centralized management system for court records, individuals, advocacy
organizations, and RoR sought records at individual county courts. Some, but not
all, counties make records available online, to varying degrees, and information
about accessing court records is often murky.161 What is more, Virginia court
McAuliffe Policy Memorandum, Governor McAuliffe’s Restoration of Rights Policy (Aug. 22,
2016),
https://commonwealth.virginia.gov/media/6733/restoration-of-rights-policy-memo82216.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4CK-72J2].
156. See Outgoing Va. Gov. McAuliffe Says Rights Restoration His Proudest Achievement,
ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 10, 2018, 9:00 PM), https://wtop.com/virginia/2018/01/gov-terry-mcauliffefinal-state-commonwealth [https://perma.cc/26YZ-U55L].
157. Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 416, 420 (2012).
158. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3806 (requiring that notice be provided to a data subject of “the
possible dissemination of part or all of this information to another agency, nongovernmental
organization or system not having regular access authority,” and requiring the agency to “indicate
the use for which [the data] is intended”); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.23803 (requiring that agencies holding personal information “[m]ake no dissemination to another
[data] system without (i) specifying requirements for security and usage including limitations on
access thereto, and (ii) receiving reasonable assurances that those requirements and limitations will
be observed”).
159. Each year, RoR makes public a list of individuals whose rights have been restored (as
required by Article V Section 12 of Virginia’s constitution). See LIST OF PARDONS, COMMUTATIONS,
REPRIEVES AND OTHER FORMS OF CLEMENCY, SENATE DOCUMENT NO. 2 (2017),
https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2017/SD2/PDF [https://perma.cc/E5YJ-P3AN] for a recent
example listing individuals whose civil rights were restored between January 2016 and January
2017. These lists do not contain personal information such as contact information, date of birth, or
social security numbers. This makes it difficult for advocacy organizations to reach out to individuals
whose rights have been restored to conduct new and returning voter education efforts.
160. For a brief period prior to leaving office, Governor Robert F. McDonnell restored rights
to individuals who had not applied for rights restoration upon receiving lists from Virginia’s
Department of Corrections of individuals who had completed their terms of incarceration and
supervised probation. See Governor McDonnell Announces Process for Automatic Restoration of
Voting and Civil Rights for Non-Violent Felons, ALEXANDRIA NEWS (July 15, 2013),
https://www.alexandrianews.org/2013/governor-mcdonnell-announces-process-for-automaticrestoration-of-voting-and-civil-rights-for-non-violent-felons/ [https://perma.cc/87ZA-6GPM].
161. See VIRGINIA COURTS CASE INFORMATION WEBPAGE, http://wasdmz2.courts.state.va.us
/CJISWeb/circuit.jsp [https://perma.cc/8DDN-YFA8] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (“This is the case
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clerks are elected, meaning that politics may play a role in how quickly courts
respond to requests for information on people seeking to restore their civil
rights.162 Beginning in 2016, McAuliffe no longer required people to produce
court records in order to regain their right to vote.163 Yet, in the case of federal
convictions, RoR must verify information with federal law enforcement agencies
and federal courts, a process that has also proved challenging due to federal court
clerk concerns about data sharing and privacy.164
Despite gubernatorial efforts to simplify the rights restoration process, RoR
and voting rights organizations still exert “a tremendous amount of effort” to
identify individuals eligible for rights restoration in Virginia.165 Finding contact
information for individuals recently released from prison and not under supervised
probation or parole is often a challenge. Those recently released from prison often
live with friends or families or in transitional housing, and they therefore lack a
permanent address.166 For those released from the correctional system years or
management system for circuit courts in Virginia. This is a project with a limited number of courts.
Cases may be searched using name, case number, or hearing date. Searches must be done by
individual courts. Statewide searches are not possible. Please note: The Circuit Courts of Alexandria
and Fairfax do not use the statewide Circuit Case Management System, and therefore, cannot
participate in the Online Case Information System. Please contact these courts directly for case
information not available through this System.”).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-217. Prior to McAuliffe’s removal of the requirement that fines
and fees be paid as a condition of rights restoration in July 2015, providing proof of payment of fines
and fees constituted an enormous obstacle to many because of difficulties associated with confirming
payment at the relevant court. See Travis Fain, McAuliffe Widens Voting Rights Restoration, DAILY
PRESS (June 23, 2015), http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-nws-mcauliffe-felon-voting20150623-story.html [https://perma.cc/SD3J-UZ2L] (describing how McAuliffe removed the
requirement that individuals pay court costs prior to applying for rights restoration). The governor’s
order did not remove the requirement that court fees be paid, it just provided that payment status
would no longer prevent individuals from applying for rights restoration.
163. See Governor McAuliffe Policy Memorandum, supra note 155 (noting that the RoR will
affirmatively restore rights to individuals even when they have not applied for rights restoration).
164. Citing privacy concerns, federal court clerks hesitate to share conviction data with RoR,
making it surprisingly difficult for RoR to confirm that Virginians with federal convictions have
completed their sentences for purposes of restoring their right to vote. Interview by co-author
Rebecca Green with Kelly Thomasson, Va. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, in Richmond, Va. (Mar.
10, 2017) (discussing a letter that Thomasson received from a Fourth Circuit clerk). The Virginia
State Police has access to federal data, but only recently began sharing this information with RoR.
Federal probation officers and judges have expressed discomfort with sharing information in bulk
about federal conviction histories, instead requiring RoR to make individual requests. RoR therefore
sends hundreds of individual letters asking for information to confirm completion of incarceration
and supervised probation. Federal probation officers have told RoR that they will not disclose names
of people currently under supervision, citing privacy concerns. Id.
165. Graham Moomaw, McAuliffe Rights Restoration Official Will Stay on Under Northam,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/governme
nt-politics/mcauliffe-rights-restoration-official-will-stay-on-under-northam/article_bfdc6d2a-525b56e5-a2df-02e0083be72e.html [https://perma.cc/3TTG-K8TM].
166. See Richard P. Seiter & Karen R. Kadela, Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not,
and What Is Promising, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 360, 361 (2003) (“Prisoners have historically returned
to the communities from which they were sentenced, generally to live with family members, attempt
to find a job, and successfully avoid future criminality.”); Nathan James, Offender Reentry:
Correctional Statistics, Reintegration into the Community, and Recidivism, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
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even decades ago, locating accurate address information is similarly daunting, a
task made more difficult if the individual moves, especially out of state, or changes
her name.
Another cognizable hurdle to locating individuals who are eligible for voting
rights restoration is reticence on the part of people with prior convictions to engage
with government institutions. Institutional avoidance among people with histories
of police stops, arrests, convictions, or incarceration is well documented.167 This
lack of engagement with societal institutions has negative impacts on people’s
health, employment, financial security, and exposure to crime. The surveillance
state may even “fuel the very behavior it is trying to suppress,” because people
who live “off the books” lack the sorts of institutional attachments, such as
employment, associated with low crime rates.168 Unsurprisingly, this pattern of
disengagement disproportionately impacts disadvantaged and minority
populations.169
Many otherwise-eligible Virginians hesitate to come forward because of a
perceived stigma related to their convictions. One caller to a radio talk show about
rights restoration in Virginia who lost his voting rights as a young adult for
marijuana possession explained that he lies to his kids every year on Election Day
when they ask whether he voted.170 Many Virginians excluded from the political
polity are too embarrassed to come forward to regain the right to vote.171
Additionally, in summer of 2016, frequent changes in policy combined with backand-forth litigation left many otherwise-eligible Virginians confused about
whether their right to vote could be restored.172
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34287.pdf [https:// perma.cc/9HGS-NZKX] (noting
several factors that make housing difficult for inmates recently released, including “the scarcity of
affordable and available housing, legal barriers, discrimination against ex-offenders, and strict
eligibility requirements for federally subsidized housing”).
167. See generally Brayne, supra note 62.
168. Id. at 372.
169. Id. at 369, 385.
170. Hearsay with Cathy Lewis, WHRO RADIO (June 4, 2013), http://www.hearsay.org
/post/HearSay-from-the-Headlines-64.aspx [https://perma.cc/9KQC-6KHU] at 16:15 (follow
“Download Episode” hyperlink).
171. See, e.g., Sam Levine, Listen to Former Felons Who Can Vote Again Explain the Power
of the Ballot, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/virginiarestoration-of-voting-rights_us_5a045ea9e4b03deac08b96f9
[https://perma.cc/2DW9-2QFW]
(describing one citizen’s embarrassment regarding his right to vote because he felt like an “outcast”
on Election Day).
172. Revive My Vote, a project at William & Mary Law School to assist Virginians in
regaining the right to vote, see REVIVE MY VOTE, supra note 147, receives frequent callers to its
hotline who assume that the Virginia Supreme Court decision prevents McAuliffe from restoring
voting rights to otherwise-eligible Virginians. This is crippling misinformation, since there has never
been a better time for restoring voting rights in Virginia. See Zachary Roth, Murky Picture on Voting
Rights for Virginia’s Ex-Felons, NBC NEWS (July 26, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com
/politics/2016-election/murky-picture-voting-rights-virginia-s-ex-felons-n617261 [https://perma.cc
/8CZY-D6DH] (“Thanks to confusion and uncertainty caused by the back and forth, not to mention
the lengthy timeline likely required for restoring rights individually, it’s far from clear just how many
former felons will end up registering to vote by the fall.”).
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Although McAuliffe was extremely motivated to restore voting rights to as
many Virginians as he could, and despite the expansiveness of the modern
surveillance state, the task of locating eligible Virginians was remarkably fraught.
These residents of the surveillance gap proved very difficult to find.
E.

Conclusion

As these case studies show, life in the surveillance gap can be miserable and
dehumanizing. It can harm mental and physical health, reinforce poverty, tear
apart families, and strip people of dignity. In the surveillance gap, economic
stability is difficult to maintain, and becoming economically mobile is nearly
impossible. For citizens within the gap, the ability to effect change through voting
is often restricted by barriers to voter registration, such as a lack of a permanent
address (i.e., homeless individuals), voter disenfranchisement, or system
avoidance. Government and private actors increasingly gather, aggregate, and
analyze data to tackle social issues and apportion resources in health care,
education, financial services, and more. People in the surveillance gap are
excluded from these data streams due to a lack of access to technology,173 fear of
creating an electronic trail,174 or failure to be captured within mainstream data
collection mechanisms.175 As a result, their experiences and needs are left out of
policy discussions and responses.176 Laws perpetuate the surveillance gap—a
largely lawless zone. Moreover, elites obtain political benefits from the
surveillance gap and maintaining its boundaries. The myth about the surveillance

173. See Andrew Perrin, Smartphones Help Blacks, Hispanics Bridge Some—but Not All—
Digital Gaps with Whites, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/08/31/smartphones-help-blacks-hispanics-bridge-some-but-not-all-digital-gaps-withwhites/ [https://perma.cc/3CV9-QRUG]; Andrew Perrin, Digital Gap Between Rural and Nonrural
America Persists, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 19, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/05/19/digital-gap-between-rural-and-nonrural-america-persists/ [https://perma.cc/6T4Z5XUB]; Access & Use of Technology: Factors Affecting Access and Use of Information Technology,
USC PRICE TOMÁS RIVERA POL’Y INST. (June 19, 2015), http://immigrantservices
.uscmediacurator.com/key-barriers-to-access-and-use-of-technology-2/
[https://perma.cc/H6KFP5ZK].
174. See Mary Ann Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 453 (2017);
Joel Rose, Federal Plan to Keep Files of Immigrant Social Media Activity Causes Alarm, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/30/554557044/federal-plan-to-keepfiles-of-immigrant-social-media-activity-causes-alarm [https://perma.cc/8J9P-9KXE].
175. Mimi Onuoha, On Missing Data Sets (Aug. 15, 2016), https://github.com
/MimiOnuoha/missing-datasets [https://perma.cc/PTD9-9EBL]. Onuoha lists four reasons why
datasets that should exist might not:
1. Those who have the resources to collect data lack the incentive to. 2. The data
to be collected resist simple quantification (corollary: we prioritize collecting
things that fit our modes of collection). 3. The act of collection involves more
work than the benefit the presence of the data is perceived to give. 4. There are
advantages to nonexistence.
Id.
176. Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 58–60 (2013)
(describing economic and political harms of big data exclusion).
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gap is that its inhabitants are responsible for their plight and affirmatively choose
to remain invisible. By upholding this myth, society evades the collective costs of
reforming structural systems that cause and perpetuate the surveillance gap.
III.
FRAMING THE SURVEILLANCE GAP
The discussion below examines the surveillance gap through five analytical
lenses. First, we look to the growing recognition in privacy theory of differentiated
privacy harms—the idea that different groups experience privacy harms in
different ways. Second, we examine how feminist legal theory teaches us about
the problem of viewing privacy harms through a strictly public-versus-private
lens. Third, we review the consumer and criminal privacy scholarship that attaches
agency to individuals through choice and consent defaults. Fourth, we explore
fundamental rights theories of privacy, examining how countries that have
formalized this theory into their bodies of laws effectively closed the surveillance
gap altogether. Finally, we analyze how and whether Helen Nissenbaum’s theory
of contextual integrity can inform our understanding of the harms suffered in the
surveillance gap.
A.

Differentiated Privacy

In 1890, the grandfathers of American privacy law, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis, criticized the growing phenomenon of yellow journalism, chronicling
the lifestyles of the rich and famous, in their seminal article, The Right to Privacy.
Warren and Brandeis wrote:
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can
only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world,
and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become
more essential to the individual.177
For Warren and Brandeis, the objects under the microscope were their elite
peers; the voyeuristic masses ogled elites distastefully through the expanding dual
scourges of instantaneous photography and penny journalism.178 American
privacy law was therefore born not of respect for every American’s right of
177. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
178. Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295,
1304 (2010) (contending that Warren and Brandeis wanted to protect elites from the glare of privacy
invasions by social inferiors).
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privacy, but rather of a push for rarified privacy, freeing elites from the gaze of
the uncivilized.179 Warren and Brandeis’s assertions in some way mark the
beginning of marginalized groups’ exclusion from the privacy narrative.180
In his 1967 book Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin—another significant
privacy scholar—took a more democratized approach to privacy, arguing that
privacy of the common man manifested a core pillar of democratic society.181
Westin painstakingly documented the many ways in which the lack of privacy
marked the totalitarian state.182 The expansion of privacy enabled the democratic
citizen to form her thoughts and engage in democratic betterment.183 Though
Westin democratized privacy, he did not address marginalized groups or examine
the nuanced problem that too much privacy poses.184 For Westin, privacy was a
good that every democratic citizen ought to seek and enjoy.185
Since Westin, scholars have fostered a narrative of privacy’s gradual demise.
In light of an increasingly powerful and omnipresent administrative surveillance
state and increasingly sophisticated private-sector efforts to track consumers onand offline, scholars began to examine the impact of privacy laws and norms on
different groups—what we call here “differentiated privacy.”186 Others began to
ask whether and under what circumstances too much privacy is a problem.187
More recently, new strains of scholarship have begun to examine more nuanced
impacts of differentiated privacy. Scholarship examining discriminatory
surveillance is one example.
179. See Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1424–27. For an additional critique of Warren and
Brandeis as elitist, see ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 125, 135–36 (2000).
180. See Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1394. “The right to be left alone was conceived to
protect society’s elites (such as Warren and Brandeis) from the glare of public scrutiny.” Id. at 1426.
181. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 24 (1967) (“Just as social balance favoring
disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems, so a
balance that ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure and
surveillance is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies.”).
182. See id. at 651–58.
183. See id. at 51 (1967) (“[P]rivacy is a necessary element for the protection of organizational
autonomy, gathering of information and advice, preparation of positions, internal decisionmaking,
inter-organizational negotiations, and timing of disclosure. Privacy is thus not a luxury . . . ; it is a
vital lubricant of the organizational system in free societies.”).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Helaine F. Lobman, Spousal Notification: An Unconstitutional Limitation on a
Woman’s Right to Privacy in the Abortion Decision, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 12, 531–60 (1984)
(women); Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 HARV.
BLACKLETTER J. 181, 215 (1991) (poor people); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY:
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 22–55 (1997) (Black women). This term
should not be confused with “differential privacy,” which refers to a process of systematically adding
“random numbers generated from a special distribution centered at zero to the results of all data
queries” for the purposes of protecting the privacy interests of individuals whose data is contained
in datasets. See Jane Bambauer, Krishnamurty Muralidhar & Rathindra Sarathy, Fool’s Gold: An
Illustrated Critique of Differential Privacy, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701, 703 (2014).
187. Feminist legal theory narratives discussed below provide examples. See infra Part III.B.
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Discriminatory surveillance can be understood as surveillance of, or privacy
intrusions on, certain groups as opposed to others. John Gilliom’s work on the
welfare system’s hyper-surveillance of women receiving government benefits in
rural Appalachia is illustrative.188 Other scholars follow this line of thought,
wondering to what extent the dominant privacy narrative left out the stories of
marginalized groups.189 They have explored what marginalized people have long
known: that marginalized people tend to have less privacy in their homes, bodies,
and decisions than their more privileged counterparts.190 As far back as the United
States’ founding, “overseers of the poor” chased indigent people out of colonial
towns or auctioned them off for labor.191 In the 1800s, “when poorhouses became
the dominant poor relief policy, the poor were warehoused in dismal quarters
where they labored under the watchful eye of the ‘keeper.’”192 Near the turn of
the twentieth century, poverty policy became more benevolent;193 nevertheless,
the Scientific Charity Movement “relied on ‘friendly visitors’ to investigate the
homes of the poor and exhort them to higher morals.”194 When the New Deal
created the modern welfare state, surveillance of the “undeserving poor”—ablebodied adults seen as capable of doing work—continued.195 For instance, in
administering welfare, “states devised a variety of surveillance tactics—such as
midnight raids on welfare recipients’ homes and moral fitness tests.”196 These
tactics aimed to “reduce the welfare rolls and push poor women, mostly of color,
into the low-wage labor force.”197 Welfare surveillance continues today, in the
188. GILLIOM, supra note 4.
189. See, e.g., Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1389; BRIDGES, supra note 4, at 5–6; Franks,
supra note 174, at 427–28; VIRGINIA EUBANKS, DIGITAL DEAD END 25–34 (2011).
190. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 58; see also GILLIOM, supra
note 4, at 19.
191. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 58; see also WALTER I.
TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 9 (6th
ed. 1999).
192. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also TRATTNER, supra
note 178, at 57–61; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 27–28 (10th ed. 1996).
193. See Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 583–84 (2001).
194. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also KATZ, supra note
192, at 70 (discussing the role of “charity organization society agents and visitors”); TRATTNER,
supra note 191, at 91–92 (discussing the proliferation of charitable organizations during this time
and their practices).
195. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59. On the New Deal division
between deserving and undeserving poor, see Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare
Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 257–58 (2014), and sources cited therein.
196. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON,
CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 21 (2011)
(describing the “man in the house” rule, according to which unmarried women who were found
sleeping with men were deemed morally unfit and cut off from assistance).
197. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also GUSTAFSON, supra
note 196, at 21 (“The unstated but underlying goals of the rules were to police and punish the
sexuality of single mothers, to close off the indirect access to government support of able-bodied
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form of drug tests, DNA tests, fingerprinting, extreme verification requirements,
and various forms of intrusive questioning.198 In short, scholars have documented
the ways in which many marginalized persons have far less privacy than other
Americans. Yet this narrative is incomplete; some marginalized persons have too
much privacy.
Dean Spade explains the mechanisms by which the administrative state
categorizes people, resultantly replicating power imbalances and further harming
marginalized groups.199 Social welfare programs “are designed in ways that
reflect and amplify contemporary understandings of who is ‘inside’ and who is
‘outside’ of the group whose protection and cultivation is being sought, which
means they always include determinations of who deserves protection and who is
a threat.”200 The groups of people described in this article’s case studies are all
persons considered, in one way or another, to be a threat—either for their
criminality, their impact on labor competition, or their failure to succeed in a

men, to winnow the welfare rolls, and to reinforce the idea that families receiving aid were entitled
to no more than near-desperate living standards.”).
198. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 59; see also Gustafson, supra
note 4, at 312–21 (discussing drug testing of welfare recipients); BRIDGES, supra note 4, at 111–12
(discussing intrusive questions asked of Medicaid recipients); Class Differential, supra note 4, at
1397–1400 (discussing privacy intrusions that welfare recipients face, including paternity testing
and fingerprinting). The current welfare system focuses on putting poor people to work, but the lowwage workforce—where one-third of workers are employed—is rife with sophisticated surveillance
tactics:
Employers today log computer key strokes, listen to telephone calls, review
emails and Internet usage, conduct drug tests, employ mystery shoppers, watch
closed-circuit television, and require psychometric and “honesty” tests as
conditions of employment. Employers increasingly track employee movements
through GPS or radio frequency devices, which “create new streams of data
about where employees are during the workday, what they are doing, how long
their tasks take, and whether they comply with employment rules.”
Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 60 (quoting Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the
Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent,
93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 112 (2014)); see generally Kirstie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An Overview,
51 LAB. HIST. 87 (2010); ALEX ROSENBLAT, TAMARA KNEESE & DANAH BOYD, DATA & SOC’Y
RESEARCH
INST.,
WORKPLACE
SURVEILLANCE
(2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536605 [https://perma.cc/6Z9E-6RBR]; Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz,
supra note 67 (discussing workplace surveillance).
199. DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND
THE LIMITS OF LAW 73–93 (Rev. ed. 2015). Spade writes in the context of critical trans theory.
Administrative sorting by gender is problematic because trans people can be difficult to classify,
misclassified, or forced into categories that do not match their lived existence. Id. at 77. As a result,
the state denies many trans people basic life necessities, such as health care, and exposes them to
violence, such as through incarceration in sex-segregated facilities. Id. at 81–82. The War on Terror
in particular has heightened the costs of “inconsistencies in identifying information.” Id. at 16.
200. Id. at 75. Scholarship on surveillance and social sorting makes a similar point. See, e.g.,
Magdalena König, The Borders, They Are A-Changin’! The Emergence of Socio-Digital Borders in
the EU, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. (Mar. 31, 2016), https://policyreview.info/node/403/pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2TW-JNSD] (“[M]odern surveillance becomes increasingly influential in
determining societal power relations.”).
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capitalist system. Thus, they fall outside the line of societal protections, resources,
and support.201
Surveillance scholars are also beginning to unpack what can be termed bigdata discrimination.202 What happens when the harnessed forces of big data meant
to address societal problems have negative impacts on certain groups? One early
observer of this phenomenon, Kate Crawford, pointed to the problem of benefits
flowing principally to the affluent and Internet-connected:
Big data can provide valuable insights . . . but it can only take us
so far. Because not all data is created or even collected equally,
there are “signal problems” in big-data sets—dark zones or
shadows where some citizens and communities are overlooked or
underrepresented. . . . [B]ig-data approaches to city planning
depend heavily on city officials understanding both the data and
its limits.203
Crawford cites Boston’s “Street Bump” app as an example. As the civic data
movement took off, the City of Boston joined in, enabling city dwellers to
transform their phones into mobile pothole detectors using a simple app. The app
transmitted data directly to city government, which used the data to determine
which areas of the city most needed street repair. Although an ingenious bit of
civic imagination, the project had its weaknesses: most notably, residents of the
more affluent portions of the city were more likely to install the app, thus distorting
the true picture of need and exacerbating already-enormous disparities in Boston
street maintenance.204
Daniel Castro similarly urges attention to this “data divide,” pointing out that
“individuals who come from data-rich environments may find that they have a
201. See SPADE, supra note 199, at 75 (“Norms regarding race, gender, sexuality, national
origin, ability, and indigeneity always condition and determine who falls on either side of [the]
line.”).
202. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (discussing big-data discrimination in employment and lack of adequate
legal remedies); Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015) (discussing
impacts of administrative database screening and digital watchlisting programs); Pauline T. Kim,
Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) (discussing bigdata discrimination in employment); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, GA.
L. REV. 38 (forthcoming 2017) (discussing big-data discrimination in policing); Craig Konnoth,
Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317 (2017) (discussing big-data discrimination in
health care). On the risk of exclusion, see Lerman, supra note 176, at 55.
203. Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data: Why the Rise of Machines Isn’t All It’s Cracked
Up to Be, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-bigdata/ [https://perma.cc/X64D-HLWJ].
204. Id. Other scholars have picked up on Crawford’s concern. See, e.g., Barocas &
Selbst, supra note 202, at 685 (“[Errors of exclusion] may befall historically disadvantaged groups
at higher rates because they are less involved in the formal economy and its data-generating
activities, have unequal access to and relatively less fluency in the technology necessary to engage
online, or are less profitable customers or important constituents and therefore less interesting as
targets of observation.”); Lerman, supra note 176, at 55 (discussing the “threats big data poses to
those whom it overlooks”).
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comparative advantage over those who grow up in data poverty,” and suggesting
that these “advantages may translate into better health care outcomes, increased
access to financial services, enhanced educational opportunities, and even more
civic participation.”205 This growing divide may lead to “data deserts,” or “areas
of the country characterized by a lack of access to high-quality data that may be
used to generate social and economic benefits.”206 Harms that result from data
deserts and discriminatory algorithms are drawing increasing scholarly
attention.207 The case studies in this article show that the deserts already exist.
These examples provide illustrations of potentially discriminatory impacts of
the civic data movement, data deserts, and distortion. Low-income people in
particular risk either exclusion from opportunities such as access to credit or
exposure to discrimination in the form of predatory lending based on data-driven
algorithms, collaterally and adversely impacting areas such as employment,
education, and policing.208 Yet current law, devised long before the rise of the
Internet, provides scant protection against data discrimination.209
Since Warren and Brandeis, privacy scholarship has reckoned with
differentiated privacy. Increasingly, modern privacy scholarship focuses on the
problem of discriminatory surveillance, data collection, and data use. The
surveillance gap adds an additional harm: discrimination that arises from the lack
of data inputs from marginalized groups. The next section traces seeds of this idea
in feminist legal theory.
B.

Feminist Legal Theory and the Public/Private Binary

The bulk of privacy scholarship focuses on defining the benefits of privacy,
tracking privacy’s demise, and suggesting remedies to restore it. In these
discussions, privacy generally has positive connotations; it is variously associated
with “freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control
over information about oneself, freedom for surveillance, protection of one’s
reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.”210 By contrast,
205. Castro, supra note 5, at 2.
206. Id.
207. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015) (describing privacy
implications of corporate data collection and analysis); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing
how scoring industries collect data and apply algorithms to rank consumers without oversight of
how the ranking is done or protections against discriminatory scoring outcomes); Anupam
Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017) (discussing discriminatory effects
of corporate consumer data use); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (describing data discrimination).
208. See Madden, Gilman, Levy & Marwick, supra note 12, at 56–57. Increasingly, big data
profiles are being built not only from information gathered about individuals, but also from social
networks inputs, subjecting people to inferences drawn from the behavior of their online “friends.”
Id. at 56.
209. See generally id. at 79–112.
210. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2002).
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feminist theorists have long recognized that privacy can be a double-edged sword;
their insights are thus helpful for examining surveillance gaps.
Second-wave feminists identified and deconstructed the public/private divide
in society and law that historically served to oppress women.211 Traditionally, the
public domain was dominated by men to the exclusion of women, namely in work
and politics.212 “By contrast, the private domain was that of home and family,
where autonomous individuals lived free from state interference.”213
Nevertheless, feminists observed that domestic autonomy only truly extended to
men, because women and children depended on them for material goods.214 This
dominance emboldened men to abuse women in the home, their abuse exacerbated
by a parallel failure of the state to intervene.215 Elizabeth Schneider called this
dynamic “the violence of privacy.”216 Recognizing that facially harmless
government inaction can ultimately be as detrimental as overtly destructive
government action, feminists “rejected the view that the government’s hands-off
approach was formally neutral, because the state set the legal ground rules that
permitted private inequality to flourish unchecked.”217
Moreover, feminists argued that the ideal of autonomy was a myth for
women, who are typically enmeshed in family relationships of dependency, caregiving, and attachment.218 Catherine MacKinnon posited that privacy can never
be a basis for claiming rights, because it is a tool of gender subordination that
leaves men alone (that is, out of the public eye) and thus free to oppress women.219
The feminist critique of the public/private divide led to legal and political demands

211. See Martha A. Ackelsberg & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Privacy, Publicity, and Power: A
Feminist Rethinking of the Public-Private Distinction, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL, FEMINIST
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY 213, 217–20 (1996).
Parts of this summary of feminist legal theory were previously recounted in Michele Estrin Gilman,
Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L. FORUM 1, 14–23 (2008) [hereinafter Welfare,
Privacy].
212. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; see also Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing
Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 568 (2006) (summarizing the public/private dichotomy).
213. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; Kim, supra note 212, at 568–69.
214. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; see also Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the
Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 850–51 (2000).
215. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14; see also Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love:
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 128–29 (1989); NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK,
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 180 (2006).
216. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 983 (1991).
217. Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 14–15; see also Frances Olson, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1510 (1983); OKIN, supra
note 215, at 111.
218. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988); Robin
West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 84 (1987).
219. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 194 (1989).
Further, MacKinnon argued that privacy obscures women’s lack of choice and consent within the
private realm, and, by isolating women, it obscures “women’s shared experience.” Id.

GILMANGREEN_PUBLISHERPROOF_3.28.18 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

288

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

4/14/18 9:18 PM

[Vol. 42:253

and had powerful repercussions. For instance, the state today criminalizes
domestic violence, provides legal recourse for women demanding equal treatment
in the workplace, and recognizes a right to abortion, which enforces decisional
privacy.220
This second-wave feminist theory of privacy, however, faced at least three
major critiques. First, because it is based on the experiences of white, middle-class
women, it ignored differences of class and race, particularly the experiences of
poor, African-American women, who have historically lacked privacy in their
bodies and homes.221 The state appropriated Black women’s bodies during
slavery222 and subsequently coerced poor Black women into sterilization,
disproportionately removed Black children from their homes through the child
welfare system, and subjected Black women to searches and ongoing surveillance
as a condition of receiving welfare.223 Thus, for poor, minority women, privacy
in the home could offer a refuge from the oppression and racism of the outside
world.224 At the same time, Black women were never excluded from the
workforce; after slavery, they often worked outside the home, usually in domestic
roles or backbreaking manual labor.225
Second, the feminist critique downplayed certain positive liberal values
associated with privacy. Liberal feminists such as Anita Allen and Linda McClain
have championed privacy, unwilling to “toss out the baby . . . with the bath
water.”226 They acknowledge the harms done to women under cover of
“privacy,”227 but contend that a reconceived notion of the public/private divide
can be valuable for women as both a descriptive tool and normative goal. Privacy

220. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 4–5 (2000).
At the same time, engagement with the state to combat domestic violence has costs; the state often
reflects and enforces patriarchal norms, and state enforcement limits women’s autonomy. Id. at 181–
98 (describing tensions inherent in the criminalization of domestic violence).
221. See Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist
Legal Theory, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 303, 319 (2005) (“[B]ecause the black female body is
inscribed and engraved with particular gendered and racialized cultural meanings, the black female
subject has never been granted the same kind of privacy as the white female, the privacy that some
feminists have argued needs to be ‘exploded.’”); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 61 (1988) [hereinafter UNEASY ACCESS] (“It is plain that in
the United States domestic privacy is a virtual commodity purchased by the middle class and the
well-to-do.”).
222. Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 770 (1999); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1437–40 (1991).
223. See id. at 1440–44.
224. Id. at 1470–71. PRISCILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 237 (2005).
225. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE
FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 1–7 (2010). “[B]lack married women have always worked
in proportionately greater numbers than white wives[.]” Id. at 2.
226. UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 71; see also McClain, supra note 222, at 765.
227. See UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 70; McClain, supra note 222, at 776.
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is essential to moral personhood and self-development;228 it provides women with
a respite from lives devoted to domestic labor.229 Following liberal tradition, these
feminists argue that women “should be permitted to live out their disparate,
nonconforming preferences” and that privacy promotes this goal by giving women
the space to develop and carry out their own ends.230
Third, a new generation of feminists has jettisoned certain forms of privacy.
This movement, called “third-wave feminism,” is generally associated with a firstperson, “narrative approach; [an] emphasis on sexual empowerment and
liberation; [an] anti-essentialist perspective” that recognizes the diversity of
women’s lives; and an “embrace of technology” as an organizing and confessional
“tool.”231 Third-wave feminism is less overtly political than its forbears and
focuses more on “personal evolution” than “collective revolution.”232 For these
feminists, “throwing off the mantle of privacy is a freely directed choice by a
liberated woman, or at least a positive step toward claiming autonomy” on her
own terms.233 Female autonomy, however, faces an inevitable backlash. Women
engaging in the public, online sphere have faced onslaughts of revenge porn and
cyber-harassment.234 In turn, Allen has queried whether we need to “coerce
privacy”235 in order to “undergird the liberal vision of moral freedom and
independence [that] is generally consistent with both liberalism and with the
egalitarian aspirations of feminism.”236
Feminist theory provides a helpful frame for considering the surveillance gap.
It recognizes that privacy, at either of its extremes, can be devastating to people’s
autonomy, dignity, and day-to-day subsistence.237 It shows how law demarcates
both public and private spheres and can be a tool for both oppression and
228. See UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 36.
229. McClain, supra note 222, at 783.
230. UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 221, at 76.
231. Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 20.
232. Id. at 20–21.
233. Id. at 22.
234. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378–84 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks,
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 350–54 (2014); Lori Janjigian, Nearly
10 Million Americans Are Victims of Revenge Porn, Study Finds, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/revenge-porn-study-nearly-10-million-americans-are-victims2016-12 [https://perma.cc/U9PC-89ZZ] (“[W]omen under 30, minorities, and members of the
LGBTQ community are much more likely to be threatened with revenge porn than men.”).
235. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 740 (1999) (“To speak
of ‘coercing’ privacy is to call attention to privacy as a foundation, a precondition of a liberal
egalitarian society. Privacy is not an optional good . . . .”).
236. Id. at 729.
237. Compare Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 113, 122 (2011) (describing the “devastating absence of privacy” for indigent pregnant
women that “distinguishes their experiences with the state from [those of] their monied
counterparts”) with Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L. QUART. 475, 475
(1999) (“Feminists have attempted to pierce this shield of [family] privacy, to reach the injustice of
family relationships and the law that permits them.”).
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liberation. Just as law creates surveillance regimes, it also can create and reinforce
surveillance gaps—by pushing certain groups into system avoidance or by
privileging powerful interests over vulnerable groups. People in the surveillance
gap—undocumented immigrants, homeless people, people with felony conviction
histories, and day laborers—tend to have too much or too little privacy. Yet
feminist theory recognizes what people in the surveillance gap know from
experience: that privacy is inherently neither desirable nor distasteful. Rather, it is
a deeply contextualized condition, its value varying based on the differences in
people’s lives.
A key strand of feminist theory focuses on intersectionality, i.e., recognition
that people embody multiple identities and can consequently suffer multiple
oppressions on the basis of self-identity. Intersectionality is a “method for
interrogating the institutional reproduction of inequality, whether at the level of
the state, the family, or of legal structures more generally.”238 Kimberle Crenshaw
identified how people experience different, interlinked systems of oppression and
how law often fails to recognize those intersections. For instance, in employment
discrimination, Crenshaw explained that Black women sometimes “experience
discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination.”239
Because discrimination law recognizes harms only on the basis of the mutually
exclusive categories of race and sex, these Black women have difficulty stating a
cognizable legal claim.240 Similarly, people in the surveillance gap suffer from
interlocking forms of oppression and discrimination. For instance, day laborers
fall into the surveillance gap due to a combination of national origin, gender, class,
skill level, age, language, and non-citizen status. They are subject to structural
constraints emanating from the “operation of global capital, through international
relations, monetary policies, domestic social policies, the employment
relationship [and] the family.”241 This combination of identities and structural
inequalities results in extreme isolation and pushes legal relief out of reach for day
laborers, as law protects some of their individual attributes, but ignores or punishes
others. Indeed, the state of being surveilled or overlooked is itself an intersectional
factor, but one that is rarely recognized. As Mary Ann Franks writes,
“[m]arginalized populations, especially those who experience discrimination at
the intersection of multiple forms of subordination, also often find themselves at
the intersection of multiple forms of surveillance: high-tech and low-tech, virtual
and physical.”242 Or, they might find themselves pushed into the surveillance gap.

238. EMILY GRABHAM, DAVINA COOPER, JANE KRISHNADAS & DIDI HERMAN, Introduction, in
INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 1 (2008).
239. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1 U. CHI. L.F. 139,
149 (1989).
240. Id. at 141–43, 148–49.
241. GRABHAM, COOPER, KRISHNADAS & HERMAN, supra note 238, at 3.
242. Franks, supra note 174, at 464.
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Choice, Consent, and Resistance Within the Surveillance Gap

Most privacy discussions today explore how to preserve and maintain privacy
boundaries when much of our personal information has been collected and stored
by government and private industry. Although Americans routinely tell pollsters
that they value privacy,243 most appear willing to sacrifice some degree of privacy
to gain other benefits such as the convenience of online shopping, the sense of
security when travelling through an airport, or the ability to chat with a wide
network of friends on social media. The truth is that people do not want privacy
absolutely; rather, they want to choose when to give it up and when to retain it.244
Given these attitudes, along with our political history, it is not surprising that our
privacy-law regime is based on a liberal conception of the individual as an
autonomous person who freely strikes bargains for her benefit.245 This framework
is ill-fitting not only for preserving privacy, but also for bridging the surveillance
gap.
Currently, privacy law in the United States is “fragmented” and “sectoral.”246
Unlike most other developed nations, the United States does not have a single data
protection law.247 Instead, it has industry-specific statutory protections, such as
laws that govern the collection and use of data by health or financial services
industries.248 Outside of these narrow statutes, the United States relies for its
privacy regime primarily on the same approach that it has used since the 1970s—
self-regulation by the entities that gather and maintain personal data along with
responsibility on individuals to police their own data disclosures.249 This approach
243. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1880, 1886 (2013) [hereinafter Privacy Self-Management].
244. Christine Jolls, Privacy and Consent over Time: The Role of Agreement in Fourth
Amendment Analysis, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1693, 1693–94 (2013) (“Privacy, far from referring
to a sphere within which one is always ‘let alone,’ refers to a sphere in which we are allowed to
determine who may enter, when, and under what circumstances.”).
245. However, social science studies have shown this model to be imperfect, demonstrating
that individuals make choices based on false assumptions and that context, as opposed to autonomy,
shapes our privacy preferences. See Privacy Self-Management, supra note 243, at 1887.
246. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
247. Although this article focuses on federal law due to its national scope, state laws also
govern privacy, surveillance, and data collection. Partly due to congressional intransience, some
state legislators and attorneys general have been particularly energetic in protecting and enforcing
privacy interests, particularly in the consumer context. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy
Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 750 (2016); Ganka
Hadjipetrova & Hannah G. Poteat, States Are Coming to the Fore of Privacy in the Digital Era, 6
LANDSLIDE 12 (2014); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 917–18
(2009). For a list of relevant laws, see State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATORS (June 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/LLT3-A9LF].
248. See generally BJ Ard, The Limits of Industry-Specific Privacy Law, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 607,
607 (2015) (describing why “the distinct features of online commerce . . . challenge discrete industryspecific laws”).
249. See Privacy Self-Management, supra note 243, at 1880.
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is referred to as “notice and choice.”250 The linchpin of this privacy selfmanagement is the assumption that people consent to the use of their personal data
when they access a website and agree, either implicitly or explicitly, to the terms
of service. Advocates of the notice-and-choice approach contend that it respects
individual autonomy, encourages technological innovation, and helps businesses
provide information to consumers and target people with beneficial offers.251 By
contrast, critics charge that notice and choice is a fiction since people do not
understand what privacy interests they forfeit when they log on to various websites
or make consumer choices, given that privacy disclosures are lengthy, vague,
jargon-filled, and time-consuming to read.252 Even a person who reads a particular
company’s privacy policy would not understand the extent to which “Internet
giants use data mining to shape and control the environment in which consumers
use their products and services.”253 Further, simply “too many entities [are]
collecting and using personal data to make it feasible for people to manage their
privacy separately with each entity”254 or to foresee how their data might be used
downstream. In short, consumer consent is a mirage.
The law regarding government surveillance is also based on a model of
consent. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable government
searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth
Amendment protects only objectively reasonable expectations of privacy. In Katz
v. United States, the Court ruled that a defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a phone booth.255 Once outside the proverbial phone booth (or if
citizens choose not to close the phone booth door), citizens lose this protection;
they have chosen to give up their privacy rights. Thus, the Fourth Amendment
does not attach to information that people share in public or to third parties,256
such as “data given to commercial third parties, including banking records,
telephone call lists, cell phone locations, or Internet search or subscriber
information.”257 All of this privately gathered data is shared regularly with
government entities in a “public private surveillance partnership.”258 To keep
250. See Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russel, Alexander J. Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas
B. Norton, Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L.
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 486–87 (2015).
251. See id. at 489–90 (summarizing arguments).
252. Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-Governmental Actors
and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 732–33 (2015); Privacy SelfManagement, supra note 243, at 1884–85.
253. Kim & Telman, supra note 252, at 729.
254. Privacy Self-Management, supra note 243, at 1881.
255. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
256. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”).
257. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 327, 373–75 (2015); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 59 (2014).
258. Kim & Telman, supra note 252, at 763.
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anything private, one must maintain absolute secrecy, which is increasingly
impossible.259 Moreover, as everyday expectations of privacy diminish, it is less
reasonable to expect the government to respect individual privacy. Even where the
Supreme Court recognizes a reasonable privacy interest, the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause falls away in the face of
voluntary consent.260 The Court has found consent even in situations marked by
extreme police intimidation.261 As one commentator has summarized, “though the
premise of the consent-search doctrine is that people are free to decline, the reality
is that nearly everyone ‘consents,’ at least as the Court has defined that term.”262
The consent calculus falls particularly harshly on marginalized people. The
Supreme Court has ruled that once a person seeks government assistance, she
“chooses” to relinquish any claims to privacy.263 For instance, in Wyman v. James,
the Court upheld the policy of having government workers search the homes of
welfare recipients to ensure compliance with welfare eligibility requirements.264
The Court ruled that the visits were not searches covered by the Fourth
Amendment because “[t]he choice is entirely [the individual’s], and nothing of
constitutional magnitude is involved.”265 Yet someone whose children are hungry
and who faces homelessness without government assistance “consents” only
under conditions of duress.266 By contrast, more affluent citizens are not asked to
consent to searches of their private homes in exchange for the valuable
government benefits they receive, such as mortgage home deductions and child
tax credits.267
In both the consumer-privacy and government-search contexts, it is tempting
to argue that providing clear and accurate information to help people make
informed and voluntary choices would resolve these disparities in privacy norms
that contribute to the surveillance gap. Yet the choice-and-consent framework

259. Franks, supra note 174, at 438.
260. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (holding that “when the subject
of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied”); see also Tracey
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 1, 58–62 (2008).
261. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1980); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 431–32 (1991); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 194 (2001). In one study of consent
searches during traffic stops, “none of the 90–95% of subjects who consented knew of the right to
refuse consent, and those few who knew the law were skeptical that the officer would actually take
no for an answer.” Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The
Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 126, 160 (2016) (citing study).
262. Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 509, 511 (2015).
263. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971).
264. Id. at 326.
265. Id. at 324.
266. See Bach, supra note 4, at 331–32.
267. See Welfare, Privacy, supra note 211, at 24.
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assumes that people negotiate their own privacy boundaries. In the surveillance
gap, people have far less agency and information to strike privacy bargains in their
interest. Many do not consent to live with the extreme forms of privacy that
demarcate the surveillance gap. Rather, many possess little or no political voice
or power. To the degree that individuals in the surveillance gap exercise
autonomy, they must do so in a very narrow space that is restricted by outside
forces.
Compounding the problem, ideologies promoting individual choice can place
blame on marginalized groups for their predicament. Undocumented immigrants,
for example, choose to come to the United States. Criminals choose to commit
crimes. Low-wage laborers choose to work by the day. Homeless people choose
to live outside of society’s margins. Otherwise-eligible people with felony
conviction histories are uninterested in voting. But in reality, these are highly
constrained choices. Thousands of undocumented immigrants come to the United
States to flee conditions such as violence, persecution, and hunger.268 Day
laborers lack the documentation or legal status necessary to obtain work in the
formal economy.269 People with felony conviction histories find themselves
subject to the whim of arbitrary and often confusing state laws, some of which
“place no restrictions” on the ability to vote from prison (as in Vermont and
Maine),270 others of which bar people who have committed felonies from voting
for life.271 People become homeless as rents rise and incomes fall. In this way,
choice-and-consent frameworks are problematic for all people, are particularly
problematic for disadvantaged populations, and are nearly useless in the
surveillance gap. If notions of consent come to dictate our understanding of how
people fall into the surveillance gap, we are doomed to widen it. Still, agency and
choice go both ways: giving more choice to people in the surveillance gap can be
a critical means of protecting their dignity and safety.
Agency has been an important concept as privacy scholars have attempted to
understand privacy harms and construct ways to address them. A piece of the
agency puzzle came into focus with the important work of one scholar who
suggests that individual choices about information flow are a matter of context.
We turn to Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity next.

268. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 15,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence
[https://perma.cc/ER3E-GR9P]; Vivian Yee, Kenan Davis & Jugal K. Patel, Here’s the Reality
About Illegal Immigrants in the United States, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/undocumented-illegal-immigrants
.html [https://perma.cc/GCQ9-6RW7].
269. See Lee, supra note 1, at 661.
270. Brent Staples, The Racist Origins of Felon Disenfranchisement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-racist-origins-of-felon-disenfranchisemen
t.html?emc=eta1&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/J7FX-E8G5].
271. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; KY. CONST. § 145; see FLA. CONST. § 4.
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Contextual Privacy and the Surveillance Gap

In 2010, Helen Nissenbaum presented a resonant theory of privacy in a
digitally connected world. She posits that what offends privacy sensibilities is not
the sharing of information in and of itself, but the sharing of information along
pathways different from those that a particular piece of information generally
travels.272 For example, a doctor sharing a patient’s information with a nurse or
another attending physician does not raise privacy hackles; a doctor sharing her
patient’s sensitive information with a marketing agency would, for many,
constitute a grievous privacy invasion. Nissenbaum terms this idea “contextual
integrity.”273 Her premise is that the right of privacy boils down to the right to
appropriate information flows.274
Is this theory useful in understanding the surveillance gap? In one sense, fears
of contextual integrity harms propel some people into the surveillance gap. The
fear, for example, that immigrant data collected in one context (DACA) will be
used in another context (deportation) is a prime reason that many undocumented
people populate the surveillance gap.
In another sense, the surveillance gap is hard to fit within the theory of
contextual integrity. Nissenbaum’s work assumes an extreme information
environment where data flows even without individual data subjects’ knowledge.
As Nissenbaum describes it, the problem of contextual integrity arises from “the
extraordinary surge [in the modern world] in powers to communicate, disseminate,
distribute, disclose, and publish—generally spread—information.”275 In this
environment, contextual integrity seeks to explain a crisis in privacy—situations
in which privacy norms amid this massive information flow are not respected. The
surveillance gap, however, is the inverse of out-of-control information flow:
expected information flows between Point A and Point B are not happening at all.
The surveillance gap is not a failure to adhere to privacy norms, but rather a
failure—be it purposeful or accidental, benign or malignant—of data and
information to follow the same flows for residents of the surveillance gap as
nonresidents. This “information inequality” is a source of privacy concern.276
Information inequality describes the problem when the holder of data has more
information than the data subject, resulting in the data holder controlling or
otherwise duping the data subject. For example, two people might enjoy buying
books from an online bookseller. In collecting information about the buying habits
of one user versus another, the online bookseller might opt to offer a discount to
272. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010).
273. Id. at 127.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 51.
276. Jeroen van den Hoven, Privacy and the Varieties of Moral Wrong-Doing in an
Information Age, 27 SIGCAS COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Sept. 1997, at 33, 35; OSCAR GANDY, THE
PANOPTIC SORT (1993).
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one user but not the other. Both users are unaware of the benefit flowing to one
and not the other, and both are victims of information inequality with respect to
the information that the users have versus the information that the bookseller has.
Information inequality in this context is problematic, akin to price
discrimination.277 In the surveillance-gap context, information inequality results
in data flows providing benefit to some but precluding others from receiving
similar benefits because the provider of the benefit has no information about some
individuals at all.
Many of us expect that, in our modern data-driven environment, an entity,
government or otherwise, can effortlessly grant benefits to citizens. Whether the
benefit is healthcare, democratic participation, or a coupon for a consumer good,
we assume that the body hoping to bestow the good or service will be able to reach
targeted individuals to provide it. The surveillance gap disrupts this expected flow,
not by improperly re-routing information, but by stopping the flow altogether. If
privacy, as it is often conceived, is the ability to control access to self,278 then the
residents of the surveillance gap have won the privacy game—they have it. But to
the extent that residents of the surveillance gap want to assert the autonomy that a
functioning flow of information provides, or to the extent that these surveillance
gap residents have “privacy” as the result of an unwanted or inappropriate
disruption in flow, Nissenbaum’s core concern is reflected. As Nissenbaum
explains, contextual integrity is “the right to live in a world in which our
expectations about the flow of personal information are, for the most part, met.”279
In the case of the surveillance gap, information flow does not meet expectations
because information does not get where it is supposed to go. Like the notice-andchoice problem in the consumer-privacy context, residents of the surveillance gap
cannot exercise autonomy and choice in setting the norms that define information
flows to them and about them.
E.

Privacy, Fundamental Rights, and the Gap

The United States Constitution does not directly afford Americans the right
to privacy.280 In Europe, in contrast, Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of
277. See, e.g., Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 41, 43 (2014) (exploring legal and ethical principles implicated in the use of personal
information for the purpose of setting retail prices).
278. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980); see
also Westin, supra note 181, at 7 (defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others”).
279. Nissenbaum, supra note 272, at 231.
280. The United States constitutional provisions cited for protecting Americans’ privacy
require contextual interpretation of “penumbral” rights granted under the Constitution. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy
is protected from governmental intrusion.”). The Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional right
to privacy in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, id. at 484 (holding that the First Amendment
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union affirmatively grant a European Union
citizen “the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and
communications” and “the right to the protection of personal data concerning him
or her.”281 As a consequence, privacy in Europe is perceived as a fundamental
human right.282 This theoretical perspective has deep implications for European
laws ranging from aggressive libel laws to protect the dignity of persons283 to
Europe’s strict data protection rules,284 and beyond.
One might assume that a fundamental-rights approach to privacy would cast
the entire European population into the surveillance gap—i.e., that its residents
would be sheltered from surveillance because of the primacy with which
Europeans place the right to privacy. To the contrary, recognizing privacy as a
fundamental human right in Europe has a counterintuitive effect: no surveillance
gap to speak of. Indeed, as one Spanish privacy law scholar put it, the idea of a
surveillance gap in Europe is “simply unthinkable.”285
The fundamental-rights approach to privacy can inform our understanding of
the surveillance gap in the United States. Government surveillance in Europe is
generally not seen as a menacing privacy invasion that threatens personal
liberty.286 For example, one account describes the millions of European CCTV
cameras as “a friendly eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a kindly and watchful
uncle or aunt.”287 Viewing the state as a helpful partner, rather than as the ominous
threat as it is often feared to be in the United States, has the effect of closing the
surveillance gap in Europe almost entirely; this attitude defines in many ways how
protects married couples’ decision-making about contraception), and Lawrence v. Texas, 530 U.S.
558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that the Constitution implicitly grants a right to privacy even though
such right is not explicitly enumerated).
281. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7 & 8, 2012 O.J. C 326/391.
282. Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New
Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 652 (2013).
283. For example, London is widely referred to as the “libel capital of the world” given
Britain’s aggressive stance on protecting individual dignity through libel law. See GEOFFREY
ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the legal rights of journalists
and broadcasters and examining publishing and reporting laws); see also Douglas W. Vick & Linda
Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the European Union, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 999 (1996)
(discussing the problem of forum shopping in libel law and the attractiveness of European libel laws
to Americans).
284. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31.
285. Email from Pablo García Mexía, Director, Revista de Privacidad y Derecho Digital, to coauthor Rebecca Green (Apr. 15, 2017, 12:16 EST) (on file with author) (responding to the question
of whether a surveillance gap exists in Europe).
286. Private-sector surveillance, conversely, is widely seen in Europe as a violation of
fundamental privacy rights and is severely restricted through regimes like the European Union
Privacy Directive (which also curbs government data collection, but which is riddled with exceptions
to protect public safety).
287. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 494 (2006) (quoting
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 36
(2004)).
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Europeans live and interact with authorities on a daily basis and is a critical means
by which Europeans enjoy full rights of personhood. Relatedly, most European
countries have a larger social safety net than the United States,288 and poor people
may thus feel that turning over personal information to the government is well
worth the benefits obtained.
Two aspects of European administrative practice illustrate this reality. First,
many European countries use town registry systems to keep tabs on their citizens.
In Austria, all people establishing residency within a town or city must register
with the Meldebehörde for themselves and all minors in their household within
three days of moving.289 In Belgium, new residents have eight working days to
register at the municipal administration office/town hall (maison
communale/gemeentehuis).290 In Italy, residents are required to inform the local
municipality of their intention to move and their new address.291 Local
government officials verify registrations, and failure to comply with local
registration requirements within the deadline for doing so results in fines.292 This
system allows European national governments to keep track of their citizens for
purposes of public safety, administering social safety net programs, administering
nationalized healthcare, running elections, conducting the national census, and
many other administrative state functions.293
288. ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND EUROPE: A
WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 2, 18 (2004). But see IRWIN GARFINKEL, LEE RAINWATER & TIMOTHY
SMEEDING, WEALTH & WELFARE STATES: IS AMERICA A LAGGARD OR LEADER? 7–8 (2009) (arguing
that if education spending is considered, the United States fares more favorably in social welfare
spending comparisons).
289. Registration, HELP, https://www.help.gv.at/Portal.Node/hlpd/public [https://perma.cc
/28G6-FPEP] (last visited Dec. 6, 2017).
290. See Moving to Belgium: Complete Guide to Belgian Visas and Permits, EXPACTICA,
https://www.expatica.com/be/visas-and-permits/Moving-to-Belgium-Guide-to-Belgian-visas-andpermits_100069.html#Register [https://perma.cc/H5JZ-S9QF] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018);
Changement
d’adresse,
BELGIUM.BE, https://www.belgium.be/fr/logement/demenagement
/changement_d_adresse [https://perma.cc/24VT-VJ7A] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018) (describing, in
French, that Belgians have eight business days to declare a change of address at the population
service (“service population”) of the new residence or face fines).
291. See Anagrafe General Registry, FARNESINA, http://www.ambtallinn.esteri.it/ambasciata
_tallinn/en/informazioni_e_servizi/servizi_consolari/anagrafe/
[https://perma.cc/XM93-7PBU]
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
292. See Anagrafe Italiani residenti all’estero (A.I.R.E.), FARNESINA, http://www.esteri.it/mae
/en/italiani_nel_mondo/serviziconsolari/aire.html/ [https://perma.cc/6PZG-GF8X] (last visited Jan.
14, 2018) (describing, in Italian, the residency registration system, “Anagrafe della Popolazione
Residente”).
293. As in the United States, keeping track of immigrant populations poses a huge challenge
in Europe. The International Organization for Migration estimates that 387,739 immigrants arrived
in Europe in 2016. This figure includes apprehended immigrants (for example, those who attempted
sea crossings). See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIXED MIGRATION FLOWS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND
BEYOND
(2016),
http://migration.iom.int/docs/2016_Flows_to_Europe_Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8BB-3JWA]; Migration and Migrant Population Statistics, EUROSTAT
STATISTICS EXPLAINED (Mar. 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index
.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics&oldid=327524#Basis_for_data_collectio
n [https://perma.cc/B3QE-EJUM]; see also Phillip Connor, Illegal Migration to EU Rises for Routes
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A second and related illustration is the widespread use of national
identification cards in Europe.294 Many European countries require residents to
carry identification cards. Some make the national identification card
compulsory.295 Though national identification systems in Europe are not
ubiquitously approved—in Great Britain, for example, national identification
became a central campaign issue in the lead-up to the 2010 general election296—
national identification cards are nevertheless a mainstay in most European
countries, and indeed around the world.
In contrast, the United States does not have a compulsory (or noncompulsory) resident registration program, nor do citizens carry a national
identification card.297 This has caused headaches in administrative contexts,
including voting.298 By basing our laws and norms on a liberty-centric conception
Both Well-Worn and Less Traveled, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 18, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/18/illegal-migration-to-eu-rises-for-routes-bothwell-worn-and-less-traveled/ [https://perma.cc/ZKD5-8ZSE] (discussing “illegal” immigrant flows
in Europe). The inability of European countries to reliably track immigration data predated the
current refugee crisis. See Brian Wheeler, The Truth Behind UK Immigration Figures, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-19646459 [https://perma.cc/GL4E-7PQ2]
(“Keith Vaz, chairman of the influential home affairs committee says he finds it incredible that a
supermarket loyalty scheme can collect and store details on the shopping habits of millions of people,
yet a similar database can not [sic] be set up to record arrivals and departures.”). Though the system
is imperfect, European Union trans-border surveillance is highly sophisticated. See Katja Franko
Aas, ‘Crimmigrant’ Bodies and Bona Fide Travelers: Surveillance, Citizenship and Global
Governance, 15(3) THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 331 (2011) (providing an overview of trans-border
surveillance systems in the European Union). Recent proposals to add biometrics and facial
recognition tools suggest further ramping up. See Identification of Applicants (EURODAC),
MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum
/identification-of-applicants_en [https://perma.cc/K6DM-ZZK9] (last visited Dec. 6, 2017)
(describing EuroDac, biometric data collection of asylum seekers); EUROSUR, FRONTEX,
http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur/ [https://perma.cc/4YLB-6D4T] (last visited Dec. 6,
2017) (describing EuroSur, drone and satellite surveillance programs).
294. See David Lyon, National ID Card Systems and Social Sorting: International Public
Opinion, in SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION,
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS (Elia Zureik, Lynda Harling-Stalker, Emily Smith, David Lyon &
Yolande E. Chan eds., 2010).
295. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, among others, maintain compulsory
identification laws. See Kevin Drum, The Quick Way to End the Vote-Fraud Wars? A National ID
Card, MOTHER JONES 2 (July/Aug. 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/nationalid-card-voter-fraud-solution/# [https://perma.cc/TXX4-QNEG].
296. Edgar A. Whitley & Gus Hosein, GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOR IDENTITY POLICIES (2010);
HISTORIES OF STATE SURVEILLANCE IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 211–15 (Kees Boersma, Rosamunde
van Brakel, Chiara Fonio & Pieter Wagenaar eds., 2014).
297. See Jonathan Weinberg, Demanding Identity Papers, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 197 (2005)
(describing longstanding resistance to national identification in the United States); ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW: FEW BENEFITS, STAGGERING COSTS 1 (May
2008),
https://epic.org/privacy/id_cards/epic_realid_0508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XYQ-6BJ2]
(noting that throughout its history, the United States “rejected the idea of a national identification
system”).
298. Maintaining accurate voting lists presents an enormous challenge when individuals who
move from one state to another suffer no consequence for failing to remove their name from the
voter list in the state from which they moved, not to mention registering to vote in their new location.
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of privacy, Americans forgo the civic protections that a fundamental rights-based
orientation offers. This lack of civic and legal protection plagues members of the
surveillance gap. The next part explores potential ways to address the surveillance
gap’s worst consequences.
IV.
BRIDGING THE SURVEILLANCE GAP
One potential fix for the harms that stem from the surveillance gap—at least
if Europe’s experience is a guide—is surely out of reach: wholesale adoption of a
fundamental rights theory of privacy. Socio-cultural norms are undoubtedly too
ingrained to undo American aversion to state surveillance and cataloging of the
populace. Nevertheless, a dignity-based understanding of privacy may allow for a
reduction of the ill effects of the surveillance gap, as described below.
Closing the surveillance gap is difficult significantly because Americans want
their liberty to be let alone.299 For many Americans, the existence of the
surveillance gap is a manifestation of liberty. They may see the surveillance gap
not as a problem, but as an outgrowth of a value that Americans hold dear: the
right to disappear.
Additionally, the surveillance gap is a complex space, and one set of solutions
is unlikely to address the contextualized harms that arise within it. It exists for
multiple reasons, ranging from bias on the part of government actors, to economic
advantage for employers, to the choice to remain by surveillance gap residents in
the face of oppressive state systems or societal neglect. People in the surveillance
gap constitute a huge cross-section of American society and hold diverse goals
and interests. Even within the same sub-category of surveillance gap inhabitants,
interests may diverge. For example, while many Virginians with felony conviction
histories are thrilled to be “found” when it comes to regaining the right vote, others
prefer to eschew all interaction with the state—including voting.300 Indeed, being
counted is not necessarily a solution to extreme privacy because it can bring people
into systems that are themselves harmful without transforming those systems.301
Finally, “solutions” to the surveillance gap are difficult to pinpoint because
the causes of the surveillance gap are wildly intractable. Poverty, discrimination,
The result is massively bloated and inaccurate voter rolls that feed fraud accusations haunting the
American system. See Richard Hasen, THE VOTING WARS 200 (2012) (proposing national voter
registration and national voter identification).
299. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 177, at 193.
300. One of the co-authors has experienced through her work on the Revive My Vote hotline
at William & Mary Law School, REVIVE MY VOTE, supra note 147, that many applicants are joyful
to receive word that their voting rights have been restored, and some even break into tears of joy.
Volunteers conducting outreach for Revive My Vote occasionally interact with individuals who are
hostile to the idea of voting.
301. See SPADE, supra note 199, at 86–87 (encouraging a “move[] away from an uncritical call
to ‘be counted’ by the administrative mechanisms of violent systems” and instead recommending
strategizing “our interventions on these systems with an understanding of their operations and of
their tendencies to add new categories of legibility as methods of expanding their control”).
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economic subjugation, and social control all feed the surveillance gap’s existence.
If the surveillance gap is a consequence of these much larger forces, perhaps it is
no more “solvable” than these large and deeply embedded social ills.
With these complexities in mind, this section offers measures that might, at
least at the margins, address the ill effects of the surveillance gap. Our suggestions
hinge on the dual concepts of resilience and resistance. With regard to resilience,
Martha Fineman has explained how vulnerability is a universal and inevitable
human condition; for instance, we all face periods in life when we are children,
ill, or victims of accidents or disasters.302 Yet American law is built on the notion
of an autonomous individual without communal ties or responsibilities.303
Fineman thus urges creation of a “responsive state” that actively invests in
enhancing the resilience of its vulnerable citizens.304 In her view, resilience is
“what provides an individual with the means and ability to recover from harm,
setbacks, and the misfortunes that affect her or his life.”305 Resilience is “largely
dependent on the quality and quantity of resources or assets that he or she has at
their disposal or command.”306 In turn, these resources are “accrued . . . within an
array of social structures and institutions over which individuals may have little,
if any control.”307 Currently, people in the surveillance gap show tremendous
resilience in staying afloat, often through family and community support and
sharply honed survival skills. Yet from a societal perspective, they are denied
resources—such as education, job access, affordable housing, fair pay, or a voice
in our democracy—that would build their resilience and ability to live with
dignity, without fear or hardship. People in the surveillance gap currently develop
resilience in the face of a restrained state, not with the support of a responsive
state.308
Resistance is another key element of bringing privacy into balance. Scholars
have long noted how heavily-surveilled populations resist in subtle ways. Gilliom
in his study of Appalachian welfare mothers described how welfare recipients
resist government surveillance by seeking cash-only jobs to supplement their
302. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM. 1, 8–9 (2008).
303. Id. at 5, 19. (“Our current system has been built upon myths of autonomy and
independence and thus fails to reflect the vulnerable as well as dependent nature of the human
condition.”).
304. Id. at 13–15.
305. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference—The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 609, 622 (2015).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 623.
308. As an example, Fineman points to LGBT youth, who suffer high rates of homelessness,
child welfare placements, and suicide due in part to a legal system that “valoriz[es] family privacy,
parental rights, individual liberty, and choice.” Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience,
and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 309, 322 (2014); id. at 313 (“Looking at the
child within the family from a vulnerability perspective makes it apparent that it is time to rend this
veil of privacy and bring the child into focus as a political and legal subject who, independent of the
family, deserves the attention and protection of law and policy.”).
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income, accepting gifts such as diapers from family and friends, and taking similar
steps to “quietly meet the needs of their dependents through daily actions that defy
the commands of the state.”309 Similarly, studies find that call-center employees
resist surveillance by pretending to talk on the phone, leaving call lines open
without customers on the line, and misleading customers.310 Gilliom envisions a
future in which “[e]veryday tactics of evasion, subterfuge, and concealment, then,
may very well become a defining form of politics in the surveillance society.”311
These tactics also describe daily survival in the surveillance gap. However,
resistance within the surveillance gap can also look diametrically different; it often
means coming into the sunshine. To climb out of the surveillance gap,
marginalized groups benefit from organizing and demanding that they be seen.
Some examples are illustrative. For day laborers, one of the most effective forms
of resistance to the surveillance gap has been organizing through worker
centers,312 “community-based and community-led organizations that engage in a
combination of service, advocacy, and organizing to provide support to low-wage
workers.”313 Worker centers fill a regulatory and union gap. There are at least 150
of them, and they aim to engage workers in collective action within a social justice
frame.314 One common strategy is to target employers who engage in wage theft
by “calling employers and asking them to pay, filing wage claims, and picketing
when they don’t.”315 These actions have targeted small employers as well as major
chains such as Taco Bell, which was the subject of a boycott to improve working
conditions and wages for tomato pickers.316 Worker-center efforts have also been
successful in coordinating enforcement with government agencies and enacting
beneficial local and state legislation, such as a New York Unpaid Wages Law that
increased the penalties on employers for wage theft.317
Most recently, a worker center in Jackson Heights, New York developed a
smartphone app called Jornalera, which means “day laborer,” that allows workers
to track their hours and pay, take and upload pictures of work sites and employers,
and share this information for legal and advocacy efforts.318 Using technology is

309. GILLIOM, supra note 4, at 111.
310. Class Differential, supra note 4, at 1409–10.
311. GILLIOM, supra note 4, at 101.
312. See generally Kimberly M. Sánchez Ocasio & Leo Gertner, Fighting for the Common
Good: How Low-Wage Workers’ Identities Are Shaping Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 503
(2017), www.yalelawjournal.com/forum/fighting-for-the common-good [https://perma.cc/ZV5QDS9N] (discussing successful organizing strategies for day laborers).
313. Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50 N.Y.
L. REV. 417, 419 (2005–2006).
314. Id. at 431, 438; see also Héctor R. Cordero-Guzmán, Worker Centers, Worker Center
Networks, and the Promise of Protections for Low-Wage Workers, 18 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 31, 45 (2015).
315. Fine, supra note 313, at 434.
316. Id. at 435.
317. Id. at 436–37.
318. Liz Robbins, New Weapon in Day Laborers’ Fight Against Wage Theft: A Smartphone
App, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/nyregion/new-weapon-in-
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a particularly powerful way to increase the autonomy of day laborers, who are in
the best position to gauge the level of privacy that they want to retain or shed.319
Overall, worker centers “provide the necessary mechanisms to increase the
transparency of the hiring process, effectively monitor employment conditions,
and provide opportunities for worker incorporation into the formal economy.”320
Day laborers who take advantage of worker centers are also associated with higher
rates of social inclusion and reduced isolation.321 Despite these successes, the vast
majority of day laborers are not served by worker centers, and worker centers
struggle to maintain funding.322 Further, the Trump administration is expected to
impose restrictions on worker centers to limit their effectiveness, such as
limitations on protest activities.323 Still, traditional organizing tools and new
technologies hold promise for day laborers in resisting the surveillance gap.
Additional, powerful examples of resistance to the surveillance gap arise in
the context of homelessness. Homeless people have used their visibility as a way
to fight the surveillance gap. For instance, in Seattle, a coalition of shelters and
tent camps called SHARE/WHEEL fought the city’s proposed HMIS mandatory
tracking system by threatening to move all residents into public parks.324 HMIS,
which gathers data about homeless persons for the ostensible purpose of assessing
needs and coordinating services, has been critiqued for presuming that
homelessness is a personal pathology created by poor life choices that requires
state intervention and management.325 Moreover, while HMIS captures data about

day-laborers-fight-against-wage-theft-a-smartphone-app.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/2ANG8X23].
319. See Julia Ticona, New Apps Like Jornalero Aim to Protect Low-Income Workers. Here’s
How They Could Backfire, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Mar. 21, 2016, 11:18 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/03/21/new_apps_like_jornalero_aim_to_protect_lo
w_income_workers_here_s_how_they.html [https://perma.cc/5WKA-XJBD] (pointing out that
potential shortcomings to this approach include a lack of consistent Internet access, unrealistic
expectations of documentation for all wage theft claims, and potential capture of data by government
surveillance).
320. VALENZUELA, THEODORE, MELÉNDEZ & GONZALEZ, supra note 73, at 836. Worker centers
also have a positive impact on wages. See id. at 849.
321. M. Anne Visser, From Economic Integration to Socioeconomic Inclusion: Day Labor
Worker Centers as Social Intermediaries, 38 URB. GEOGRAPHY 243, 260 (2017).
322. See Cordero-Guzmán, supra note 314, at 52; Lee, supra note 1, at 661; ON THE CORNER,
supra note 68, at 22–23 (citing a 2002 survey showing that only ten percent of day laborers in the
New York metropolitan area have turned to worker centers for assistance). Worker centers also face
the risk that if they are too successful, “they will be categorized as labor organizations and subjected
to the restrictions imposed by the labor laws.” Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions,
Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 561, 580 (2014).
323. Chris Opfer & Jasmine Ye Han, Worker Centers May Get Closer Look Under Trump,
BNA DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/worker-centers-may-n57982083896/
[https://perma.cc/5ZZK-EG8L].
324. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 843.
325. See id. at 852. “What is more, appearing unkempt, carrying one’s belongings, and sleeping
on park benches have long been considered lifestyle choices, rather than survival strategies.”
Langegger, supra note 121, at 1039.
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services used, it does not allow homeless persons to identify their own needs.326
Thus, for the Seattle movement, members sought “to maintain a space outside the
gaze of the state wherein the presumption of the pathology could be both avoided
and contested.”327 The homeless individuals were less concerned about data
privacy (a pre-occupation of wealthier Americans when it comes to big data
collection), than about evading the stigma of homelessness. For this reason, Tony
Sparks argues that privacy rights are not simply carried by individuals; they also
populate physical space.328 Ultimately, the protest was successful. After lengthy
mediations, the city adopted an “opt-in” version of HMIS that did not require
individuals to offer information to receive services or require shelters to
participate as a funding condition.329
A project in Ann Arbor, Michigan involved having homeless people
photograph their everyday lives “as a way to document their struggles and
strengths . . . and to reach policy makers and the broader public about issues of
concern to homeless people.”330 This project was part of a health-promotion
strategy called photovoice—with roots in feminist theory, documentary
photography, and critical education—which helps people to see connections
between their individual situations and root causes and to devise strategies for
change.331 Participants were recruited from local shelters and trained not only in
photographic methods, but also in the ethics and power dynamics involved in
photographing other people.332 After the photo shoots, participants discussed the
content and context of their photographs, and the photos they selected were
featured in local media, a gallery exhibition, and a forum at a public theater.333
Policy makers were surprised to learn that people living in shelters sometimes held
multiple jobs,334 and they had to confront the way that homeless people perceived
the building of a new homeless shelter on the outskirts of town.335 This process of
making their lives visible was powerful for the homeless participants—they
reported improvements to their self-esteem and quality of life and spoke of the

326. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 853.
327. Id. at 855.
328. See id. at 854–55.
329. See Sparks, supra note 105, at 857–58. The victory is “bittersweet” given that the outcome
might lessen federal funding for homeless services in Seattle. See id. at 858.
330. Caroline C. Wang, Jennifer L. Cash & Lisa S. Powers, Who Knows the Streets as Well as
the Homeless? Promoting Personal and Community Action Through Photovoice, 1 HEALTH
PROMOTION PRAC. 81, 81–82 (2000).
331. See id. at 82.
332. See id. at 83.
333. See id. at 84.
334. See id. at 85.
335. See id. (“The photovoice project did not substantively affect these plans [to build a
homeless shelter on the outskirts of town] but enabled board members, planners, community people,
and community leaders to rethink issues from the perspective of the homeless.”).
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ability to define their own lives outside the parameters that society placed on
them.336
Homeless people’s visibility has led to the development of formal tactics to
render them invisible. Nevertheless, from within the surveillance gap, homeless
persons have resisted by re-asserting their visibility. In turn, “the presence of
visible poverty forces society to confront inequality of income, education, health
care, and criminal justice.”337 Ultimately, homeless people need autonomy to set
their own privacy boundaries, a power that wealthier Americans already possess.
“[W]hat homeless people . . . need more of is both publicity—through which their
needs can be recognized as legitimate—and privacy—through which they can
protect themselves from absorption and de-legitimization from the public.”338
Striking this balance is essential for other people in the surveillance gap as
well. Marginalized people tend to live at privacy’s extremes. At either end of the
spectrum, people lack control over their personal information and the degree to
which they interact with mainstream institutions. Strategies that give people the
autonomy to assert or shed privacy are essential to their individual dignity and to
fulfilling our communal, democratic promise. The examples above show that
grassroots organizing, driven by the objectives and insights of affected groups,
can be powerful in enhancing autonomy. Professionals working with marginalized
populations, such as social workers, lawyers, and community organizers, can
assist in these grassroots movements by providing support to a group’s selfdefined goals. Education about legal rights, remedies, and risks can help people in
the surveillance gap make wise decisions about how to live their lives. For
instance, many ex-felons in Virginia are unaware that they have the restored right
to vote; without that knowledge, they cannot exercise an informed opinion about
whether to register. Likewise, new technologies—as simple as a smartphone
application—can be effective in helping people strike a privacy balance that
calibrates to their needs.
In addition, some states have been receptive to building the resilience of
undocumented persons. Consider, for instance, the twelve states, along with the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, that allow undocumented immigrants to
receive driver’s licenses and obtain insurance, so that they can drive, to work and
elsewhere, without breaking the law.339 Certain states and localities are limiting
336. See id. at 85–86.
337. Rankin, supra note 105, at 52.
338. Sparks, supra note 105, at 850 (quoting Ted Kilian, Public and Private, Power and Space,
in PHILOSOPHY AND GEOGRAPHY II: THE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SPACE 115, 125 (Andrew Light &
Jonathan M. Smith eds., 1998)).
339. See Liz Robbins, For the Undocumented, a Broken Headlight Can Lead to Deportation,
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/nyregion/driving-illegalimmigration-trump-administration.html [https://perma.cc/WJ9T-8MM4] (“As many as 12 states,
along with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, offer driver’s licenses for unauthorized
immigrants, up from three in 2010.”); see also Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 765, 822–23 (2017) (discussing states that grant driver’s licenses and higher education
benefits to recipients of DACA). Such a driver’s license law “had a transformative effect on the lives
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their law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities “in
furtherance of important state interests involving their immigrant
communities.”340 These jurisdictions believe that their sanctuary stance enhances
public safety by encouraging immigrants to report crimes and by allocating
spending toward crime fighting rather than illegal-immigrant search
expeditions.341 In the current polarized political climate, advocacy at the state and
local level can sometimes be more fruitful in law reforms that aid marginalized
communities.
Lawyers should continue to develop robust visions of positive, constitutional
social rights, despite the current conception of a Constitution that protects
individuals only against government interference342 and thus fails those living in
the surveillance gap. In the 1960s and 1970s, a legal movement for constitutional
social and economic rights led the Court to adopt procedural due process rights to
protect governmental benefits and to invoke statutory interpretations that
increased access to benefits.343 While the Court became more conservative and
ultimately pulled back from an emerging theory of minimum social
entitlements,344 the future may cycle back, giving way to a more responsive state
that pulls marginalized persons into the mainstream.345
The first step in tackling the problems of the surveillance gap is to recognize
its existence and to acknowledge the harms it produces. From there, we can
integrate it into privacy discussions and create tools that enable residents of the
surveillance gap to fight against its worst consequences and to access social
supports on their own terms.

of its undocumented immigrant beneficiaries, enabling them to drive without fear of being stopped
by state or local police, arrested, detained, or fined, and thereby facilitating their daily access to
work, friends, and family.” Id. at 836.
340. See Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2016). Four states and about 633 counties have these policies. Jasmine
C. Lee, Rudy Omri & Julia Preston, What Are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html [https://perma.cc/5RNBWYHB].
341. See Armacost, supra note 340, at 1201.
342. See generally Sotirios A. Barber, Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 651, 651–52 (2006); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2271 (1990).
343. See William Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969–
Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597, 606–12 (2013) (describing the Court’s doctrine in this era and
influence of legal scholars Frank Michelman and Charles Reich).
344. Id. at 612.
345. Cf. Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 210,
247 (2008) (arguing that the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of welfare rights depends on
evolving societal norms).
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V.
CONCLUSION
The current narrative within privacy law is that privacy is dead, or at least on
life support. The loss of privacy threatens people’s sense of self and engagement
in self-expression. Poor people and members of minority groups face great privacy
incursions and may be subject to increasing forms of big-data discrimination. This
article shines a light on a countervailing reality—the harms of having too much
privacy in a society in which attachment to mainstream data streams, resources,
and institutions is necessary to thrive. Many undocumented persons, day laborers,
homeless persons, people with conviction histories, and others live within a
surveillance gap, yet this phenomenon is rarely acknowledged in privacy
discourse. The harms within the surveillance gap are serious, encompassing
physical and mental injuries, big-data marginalization, economic instability, and
loss of democratic participation. Like surveillance, the surveillance gap is a form
of social control. It keeps people down.
In response, people living in the surveillance gap have shown incredible
resilience, surviving day-to-day by engaging in multiple forms of resistance. But
small triumphs do not transform the structural inequalities that perpetuate the gap.
Accordingly, a vision of privacy and a framework for privacy law that balances
the privacy interests of all persons and that does not simply reflect the assumed
desires and needs of elites is needed. Marginalized communities should have a
role in shaping a balanced vision of privacy that recognizes both the benefits and
costs of privacy in differing contexts. Too little privacy is bad, but so is too much.
The key going forward is to get the balance right.

